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Abstract 
We study how a preferential trade agreement (PTA) affects international sourcing decisions, 
aggregate productivity and welfare under incomplete contracting and endogenous matching. Contract 
incompleteness implies underinvestment. That inefficiency is mitigated by a PTA, because the 
agreement allows the parties in a vertical chain to internalize a larger return from the investment. This 
raises aggregate productivity. On the other hand, the agreement yields sourcing diversion. More 
efficient suppliers tilt the tradeoff toward the (potentially) beneficial relationship-strengthening effect; 
a high external tariff tips it toward harmful sourcing diversion. A PTA also affects the structure of 
vertical chains in the economy. As tariff preferences attract too many matches to the bloc, the average 
productivity of the industry tends to fall. When the agreement incorporates "deep integration" 
provisions, it boosts trade flows, but not necessarily welfare. Rather, "deep integration" improves 
upon "shallow integration" if and only if the original investment inefficiencies are serious enough. On 
the whole, we offer a new framework to study the benefits and costs from preferential liberalization in 
the context of global sourcing. 
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1 Introduction
The past few decades have seen a sharp increase in the number of Preferential Trade Agreements
(PTAs). Currently, the 164 members of the World Trade Organization have on average almost
twenty PTA partners, whereas that gure was just over one in 1970.1 A parallel trend has been
the growth of trade in customized intermediate inputs and in the international fragmentation of
production. As Johnson and Noguera (2017) document, the ratio of trade in value added to trade in
gross exports has declined steadily in the last 40 years for the manufacturing sector. Interestingly,
they show that the decline was strongly inuenced by reductions of bilateral trade frictions within
PTAs. Indeed, Baldwin (2011, 2016), Blanchard (2015), Ruta (2017) and World Trade Organization
(2011), among others, have argued forcefully that global value chains (GVCs) are in reality mostly
regional, driven by the formation of PTAs.
Strikingly, we lack even a basic framework to assess the desirability of PTAs in facilitating
trade in customized inputs. This is what we aim to provide in this paper. We consider a market
with endogenous formation of two-rm vertical chains and non-contractible investments that are
specic to relationships within each chain. We show that PTAs can be welfare-improving even if
conventional trade creation forces are absent, because tari¤ preferences serve as an (imperfect)
substitute for complete contracts and stimulate value creation within chains. This is especially true
for high-productivity industries. But tari¤ preferences also yield production of too many specialized
inputs, and induce the destruction of high-productivity chains outside the PTA in exchange for low-
productivity chains inside the bloc. The implications for deep integrationare also entirely novel:
deep provisions are helpful only when original ine¢ ciencies are su¢ ciently severe, but not otherwise.
Our model therefore contrasts with standard regionalism theories in its motivation, its mech-
anisms and its results. Since Viner (1950), analyses of preferential liberalization have typically
pointed to two opposing e¤ects of preferential tari¤s, trade creation and trade diversion. Trade
creation occurs when rms from foreign partner countries produce more due to the PTA, at the
expense of ine¢ cient domestic rms. This increases overall welfare. Trade diversion occurs when
member-country rms produce more due to the PTA, but at the expense of e¢ cient nonmember
rms. This lowers overall welfare. Those e¤ects are based upon classical trade models, which rely
1For that calculation, we use the dataset constructed by Scott Baier and Je¤rey Bergstrand, available at
https://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/ and rst used by Baier et al. (2014).
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on market clearing for price formation. That is also the approach taken in modern quantitative
analyses of the welfare implications of PTAs, such as Caliendo and Parros (2015). While they
take trade in intermediate products explicitly into account, their model is based on comparative
advantage forces, with anonymous markets and well-dened world prices for all goods.
In reality, modern trade in intermediates often involves customized components that commit a
buyer and a seller to each other. First, they need to nd each other. Once matched, they become
locked in to each other and may underinvest in component-specic technology due to hold-up
problemswhen contracts are incomplete (e.g., as in Grossman and Hart, 1986). For example, a
buyer of customized components can hold up the seller and force a new bargain where he captures
some of the surplus created by sunk investments made by the seller. As the seller anticipates that
outcome, she underinvests.
We introduce a property-rights model coupled with a Walrasian matching process to capture
those e¤ects in as simple way as possible. Suppliers in di¤erent countries and with di¤erent levels of
productivity match with buyers to form vertical chains. Each supplier customizes her inputs to the
buyer within their chain, and they bargain over terms of trade. Each buyer may source customized
inputs from within his chain and/or generic inputs from a competitive market.2 The PTA a¤ects
matching, customization investments and the composition of sourced inputs. Importantly, we design
the model to shut down all Vinerian trade creation channels. We put aside classic trade creation
not because we deem it unimportant,3 but to shed light on potentially important forces that have
so far been ignored in the academic literature and in policy circles alike.
In our model, some domestic buyers form chains with suppliers from the partner country regard-
less of whether there is a PTA, while other suppliers there form chains with domestic buyers only
when the PTA is in force. For the former group, which we call incumbent suppliers, the responses
to preferential access generate a positive welfare e¤ect if and only if the external tari¤ is su¢ ciently
low, and the welfare e¤ect is higher whenever the distribution of supplier productivity is better, in
the sense of stochastic dominance. For the latter group, which we call new suppliers, the welfare
e¤ect is more nuanced because the distribution of supplier productivity itself changes. Since new
suppliers are less productive than those they replace, and since the rms do not internalize the full
2We use the term Y-chain to describe the entire supply chain. See Figure 1 on p. 10.
3After all, as Freund and Ornelas (2010) conclude from the existing literature, trade creation seems to be more
prevalent than trade diversion in actual PTAs.
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welfare consequences of rematching, the range of tari¤s such that the total welfare e¤ect of the PTA
is positive is smaller when there are new suppliers. Still, there are tari¤ levels and productivity
distributions such that the emergence of new suppliers enhances welfare over and above the e¤ect
generated by incumbent suppliers.
To understand the mechanisms, it is instructive to consider rst the impact for incumbent
suppliers. Under a PTA, they receive a higher surplus on every unit traded. This propels more
trade in customized inputs, which in turn induces suppliers to increase their relationship-specic
investments. Because without the PTA there is underinvestment due to a hold-up problem, the
PTA-induced investment tends to improve e¢ ciency. This relationship-strengthening e¤ect is neces-
sarily positive when the external tari¤ is low, but a su¢ ciently high external tari¤ induces an excess
of investment. On the other hand, there is the usual negative e¤ect from tari¤discrimination here,
trade diversion in the sourcing of components, from generics to expensive customized inputs which
increases monotonically in the tari¤. This sourcing diversion is independent of the number of units
the rms in a vertical chain initially trade with each other. In contrast, since the investment yields
greater value to every unit traded, the relationship-strengthening e¤ect is stronger, the more units
the rms initially trade. Therefore, it is more likely to dominate the negative sourcing-diversion
e¤ect when rms initially trade high volumes i.e., when they have high productivity.
For incumbent suppliers, the welfare e¤ect of the PTA is determined entirely by those two
forces. When external tari¤s are very low, PTAs raise welfare for sure. In contrast, if external
tari¤s are su¢ ciently high, PTAs are likely to harm welfare. Thus, as in the classical case, with
very high preferential tari¤s, trade diversion dominates. Yet recall that here the comparison is not
with classic trade creation, but with the relationship-strengthening e¤ect. When tari¤ preferences
are too high, they yield too muchinvestment, more than o¤setting the benet of alleviating the
original hold-up problem. The welfare e¤ect is also higher when incumbent suppliers are more
productive. Hence, we introduce a new element into Viners classic tradeo¤ by showing that tari¤
preferences are more likely to enhance welfare when applied to more e¢ cient industries, which trade
large volumes of specialized inputs even without the PTA.4
4This result is reminiscent of the natural trading partners hypothesis, which posits that agreements formed
between countries that trade heavily with each other are more likely to enhance welfare. The natural trading partners
hypothesis is often relied upon in policy circles and has empirical support (e.g., Baier and Bergstrand, 2004), but
lacks solid theoretical foundations (e.g., Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996). Our result provides a possible rationale
for it.
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Consider next new suppliers. A domestic buyer matched with a supplier in a non-PTA country
can earn higher prot by matching with a supplier with the same productivity in a PTA country.
When a PTA is formed, some buyers then break chains with existing suppliers outside the PTA
and form chains with PTA insiders. Once rematched, they benet both from the tari¤ preference
and from the improved investment incentives of the new suppliers. Two intuitive economic forces
push welfare in a negative direction. First, suppliers lost outside the PTA are (pre-investment)
more productive than those gained inside the PTA. Second, the marginal chains formed are unam-
biguously bad for welfare, in spite of the new investments. The reason is that matches are based
on private prots and fail to internalize lost tari¤ revenue.
Still, the new supplier e¤ect on welfare can be positive. Two conditions are needed for that.
First, all incumbent suppliers must yield welfare gains under the PTA. Second, the mass of new sup-
pliers must be relatively similar to the least-productive incumbent supplier, so that the fundamental
productivity of the industry does not deteriorate much with the agreement.
Observe that the mechanisms behind our results a¤ect not only allocative ine¢ ciency (as e.g.
in Antràs and Staiger, 2012a). Here, PTAs also yield changes in the production process and in the
formation of vertical chains, both of which a¤ect the aggregate productivity of the economy. All of
that happens simply because of the tari¤ preference. The upshot is that the welfare implications
of PTAs under global sourcing are much more subtle and intricate than standard models suggest.
This becomes even more evident when we model deep integration features of PTAs, like stronger
bilateral recognition of intellectual property rights. We show that they have a positive e¤ect on
trade ows, in line with the empirical literature (e.g., Mattoo, Mulabdic and Ruta, 2017), but not
necessarily on welfare. Whether deep integration is helpful or not will depend on pre-agreement
ine¢ ciencies in investment. It follows that some countries may actually be better o¤ if they kept
their agreements shallow.
Thus, our paper illustrates how global sourcing can fundamentally change the normative im-
plications of PTAs, sometimes entirely reversing Viners (1950) original idea: even purely trade-
diverting PTAs can be helpful, when one considers how they can mitigate hold-up problems created
by incomplete contracts. The central point is that, when it comes to the trade of specialized in-
puts, tari¤ preferences are not just policy instruments that directly a¤ect prices; they also a¤ect
the e¢ ciency of the production process, through changes in the incentives to invest and to form
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vertical chains.
In that sense, our paper adds to the literature that seeks to link trade liberalization to investment
and innovation. That line of research is best exemplied by Bustos (2011) and Lileeva and Treer
(2010), who provide compelling theoretical analyses combined with empirical support for their
model predictions. In both papers, the empirical analysis relies on the reduction of preferential
tari¤s (Argentine rms facing lower tari¤s in Brazil under Mercosur in one case, Canadian rms
facing lower tari¤s in the U.S. under CUSTA in the other), although their models pay no heed to the
preferential nature of the liberalization. In contrast, our emphasis is precisely on the discriminatory
aspect of tari¤ changes. Furthermore, we are interested in how they a¤ect investment and matching
patterns related to international sourcing decisions, not a special concern in the analyses of Bustos
(2011) and Lileeva and Treer (2010).
Our paper also complements research using detailed models of intermediate input trade and bar-
gaining in international trade.5 In particular, it shares important characteristics with the analysis
of Grossman and Helpman (2005), which also features a choice of location for outsourcing deci-
sions as well as matching with suitable suppliers. The structures of the models are quite di¤erent,
however. For example, whereas Grossman and Helpman adopt an "all-or-nothing" specication for
the relationship-specic investments, in our setup investments are continuous, implying that in the
absence of trade agreements investment is always suboptimal. More importantly, the goals of the
analyses are completely distinct. For example, as in much of the international sourcing literature,
the role of market thickness in shaping outsourcing decisions feature prominently in Grossman and
Helpman (2005), whereas we concentrate on the themes described above.
In terms of structure, we build on Ornelas and Turner (2008, 2012), but pursue very di¤erent
directions. Our previous papers study neither preferential liberalization, our focus here, nor deep
integration, and do not consider heterogeneity in productivity and endogenous matching, both
essential ingredients of the current analysis.
The paper is also closely related to Antràs and Staiger (2012a, b). Although their goal is to
study the optimal design of (nondiscriminatory) trade agreements, not an issue we address, their
more general point is that the e¢ ciency properties of international trade agreements are vastly
5This line of research includes, among others, Qiu and Spancer (2002), Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008) and
Antràs and Chor (2013).
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di¤erent when buyers/consumer and sellers/producers must negotiate their terms of trade through
bargaining. That may be a consequence of hold-up problems and/or matching, but the key element
is the absence of market-clearing conditions fully disciplining world prices. That is also a central
element in our analysis. Our model structure is, however, very di¤erent from Antràs and Staigers
(2012a, b), allowing us to generate very di¤erent results. In particular, unlike in their setting, we
underscore how tari¤ preferences shape the structure of the production process through their e¤ects
on investment and matching decisions.6
Finally, the paper contributes to a large literature on regional trade agreements, in particular
the strand that focuses on the welfare implications of preferential integration. For recent surveys,
see Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (2016), Freund and Ornelas (2010), Limao (2016) and Maggi (2014).
The paper is organized as follows. We set up the basic model in section 2 and study the
equilibrium without a trade agreement in section 3. In section 4 we analyze the equilibrium with
a PTA and describe its impact on rmschoices. We then assess the welfare impact of the PTA in
section 5. In section 6 we discuss the robustness of our results to alternative specications, and we
extend the analysis to trade agreements with deep integrationfeatures in section 7. Finally, we
discuss some testable implications of our model in section 8 and conclude in section 9.
2 Model
There is a continuum of di¤erentiated nal goods available for consumption in the world economy.
Consumption of those goods increases the utility of consumers at a decreasing rate. There is also
a numéraire good y that enters consumersutility function linearly. Thus, if consumers purchase
any amount of y, any extra income will be directed to the consumption of the numéraire good.
We assume relative prices are such that consumers always purchase some good y. Furthermore,
6 In related research, Conconi, Garcia-Santana, Puccio and Venturini (2018) show empirically how NAFTAs rules
of origin (ROOs) a¤ected the pattern of sourcing within the bloc. Although we abstract from ROOs in our analysis,
our framework could be adjusted to assess their welfare consequences, as we discuss in the conclusion. Also related is
the paper by Blanchard, Bown and Johnson (2017). They analyze, theoretically and empirically, optimal trade policy
in the context of GVCs, an issue we sidestep here, but which could be studied in a modied version of our framework.
Heise, Pierce, Schaur and Schott (2015) study as well how trade policy a¤ects international patterns of procurement,
but their proposed mechanism how changes in trade policy uncertainty a¤ects the mode of sourcing relationships
is very di¤erent from ours. From a di¤erent angle, Antràs and de Gortari (2017) develop a general equilibrium
framework to study how exogenous trade costs shape the geography of GVCs. Their focus is on characterizing how
production and trade costs along the value chain shape the equilibrium structure of GVCs. PTAs are likely to be an
important component of that cost structure, as Johnson and Noguera (2017) argue.
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production of one unit of y requires one unit of labor, the market for good y is perfectly competitive,
and y is traded freely. This sets the wage rate in the economy to unity.
All the action happens in the di¤erentiated sector. For each di¤erentiated nal good, production
requires transforming intermediate inputs under conditions of decreasing returns to scale. Produc-
tion is carried out by buyer (B) rms located in the Home country. Those rms act as aggregators,
transforming intermediate inputs, all produced only with labor, into marketable goods. Final good
producers obtain net revenue V (Q) when they process and sell Q intermediate inputs, where V 0 > 0
and V 00 < 0. Under this structure, there are no general equilibrium e¤ects across sectors. Thus,
without further loss of generality, we develop the analysis as if there were a single di¤erentiated
sector. Entirely analogous analyses could be carried out for other di¤erentiated sectors.
There is another country, Foreign, as well as the rest of the world (ROW ). When sourcing,
each buyer may purchase generic inputs g available in the world market and/or customized inputs
q from a specialized supplier (S). Specialized suppliers are located in either Foreign or ROW.
Generic inputs are produced by a competitive fringe and require pw units of labor. Thus, their
price in the world market is pw. We consider that Home is too small to a¤ect pw. For expositional
simplicity, we assume that neither Home nor Foreign produces generic inputs. This is not without
loss of generality, but helps us convey our main ideas in the simplest possible way. In section 6 we
discuss how alternative congurations of the generic industry would a¤ect our results.
Homes buyers face a per-unit tari¤ t on all imported intermediate goods, so a generic input
costs pw+t for them. Generally, a buyer values generic and customized inputs di¤erently. However,
we can dene units so that one unit of generic input and one of customized input have the same
revenue-generating value for a buyer.7 Under this normalization, all that matters for Bs revenue
is the total number of intermediate inputs he purchases, Q = g + q, not the composition of Q.8
Now, to acquire customized inputs, a buyer must rst match with a supplier and form a vertical
chain. There is a unit mass of heterogeneous suppliers in the world and a mass of size  2 (0; 1) of
identical buyers in Home. Suppliers are split between Foreign and ROW proportionally to  and
1  , respectively. We assume that  < . This implies that buyers would remain scarce relative
7For example, we could add a multiplicative compatibility costto the use of generic inputs. Call such costs .
That would increase the quality-adjusted cost of generics for their buyers to pw + t. But we could then simply
redene units by dividing the units of generic inputs by  and adjusting the tari¤ accordingly.
8The assumption of perfect substitutability between q and g (adjusted for quality) is not essential, but it is critical
that they are substitutes to some degree.
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to suppliers even if they matched only in Foreign. Each supplier is identied by !, a heterogeneity
parameter that indexes (the inverse of) her productivity. The distribution of suppliers in each
country follows distribution F (!), with an associated density f(!), where ! lies on [0; pw].9 To
focus on fundamental forces, we consider the simplest possible matching framework, namely a
Walrasian environment where each supplier who matches pays a fee to her buyer. We will see that,
in that setting, the equilibrium matching structure follows e¢ cient sorting i.e., low-! suppliers
match but high-! suppliers do not and is stable.
Upon forming a vertical chain, B and S specialize their technologies toward each other. This
specialization costs nothing, but implies that at any point in time a buyer purchases specialized
inputs from only one supplier. After B and S specialize toward each other, S pays for a non-
contractible relationship-specic investment that lowers her marginal cost prior to trade with B.
The investment is observed by both B and S, but is not veriable in a court of law. Nothing
essential would change if the buyer also made an analogous ex-ante investment.
Once investment is sunk, the rms decide how much to trade and at what price. The specialized
inputs are not traded on an open market, and have no value outside the chain. Furthermore, the
parties cannot use contracts to a¤ect their trading decisions.10 Instead, they need to bargain over
price and quantity of specialized inputs. If bargaining breaks down, S produces the numéraire good
and earns zero (ex post) prot, while B purchases only generic inputs. If bargaining is successful, B
imports generic inputs from ROW and specialized inputs from S. Finally, B transforms all inputs
into the nal good and payo¤s are realized.
In order to generate clear-cut analytical solutions, we adopt some specic functional forms.
Conditional on investment i, we specify the suppliers cost function as
C(q; i; !) = (!   bi)q + c
2
q2, (1)
where q denotes her customized input production. Parameter ! shifts the rms marginal cost; the
9As it will become clear shortly, in the absence of trade agreements specialized inputs are not provided when
! > pw, as in that case the buyer-supplier pair would gain nothing by trading. Since in equilibrium all suppliers j
with !j  pw do not specialize, it is useful to limit the analysis to the more interesting case where the upper limit of
the distribution of suppliers is pw, and F (!) is the truncated distribution of suppliers when !  pw.
10This would be the case, for example, if quality were not veriable in a court and the supplier could produce either
high-quality or low-quality specialized inputs, with low-quality inputs entailing a negligible production cost for the
seller but being useless to the buyer. This is the same approach used by Antràs and Staiger (2012a), among others.
8
lower is !, the more e¢ cient the rm is. In turn, c determines the slope of the suppliers marginal
cost, while b denotes the e¤ectiveness of investment in reducing her production costs. In turn, the
cost of the investment is
I(i) = i2.
Investment is bounded by i 2 [0; imax]. We assume that 2c > b2.11
Concrete functional forms are useful to analyze PTAs, where changes in tari¤s are not marginal
but discrete, from their initial levels to zero, and where we want to condition results on the extent of
the margin of preference. The linear-quadratic specication that we adopt displays properties that
are standard and provide a good representation of the key elements of our environment: investment
and original productivity reduce both cost and marginal cost (Ci < 0; Cqi < 0; C! > 0; Cq! > 0);
the marginal cost curve is positively sloped (Cqq > 0) but its slope can vary (c is a parameter); the
cost of investment is convex (I 0 > 0; I 00 > 0). This specication has the advantage of permitting
full analytical solutions at the level of a single buyer-supplier pair, a straightforward analysis of
Walrasian matching with and without a PTA, and a precise welfare analysis.
Naturally, the functional forms do impose restrictions. In particular, (1) implies Cqqq = 0, so
the marginal cost curve has no curvature. While this is a very common assumption in international
trade models (which often assume further that Cqq = 0), the sharpness of some of our results does
depend on Cqqq = 0. E¤ectively, they require that Cqqq and I 000 should be su¢ ciently small in
absolute value, but the analysis becomes particularly clean if one sets them to zero, as we do here.
We focus on the case where B engages in dual sourcing, purchasing both generic and specialized
inputs. Dene Q as the equilibrium level of total inputs sourced. When B imports some generic
inputs, his marginal gain from that purchase, V (Q), must equal his marginal cost, pw + t; this
pins down Q. To ensure production of the nal good, the initial level of marginal revenue for B
needs to be su¢ ciently high: V 0(0) > pw + t. To ensure that S does not produce all inputs, we
assume Cq(Q; imax; 0) > pw, so that even under the maximum investment (and under free trade),
the marginal cost for the most productive rm (! = 0) is still su¢ ciently high that B prefers to
purchase some generic inputs. In addition to being realistic,12 the main role of the dual sourcing
11This ensures that the e¤ect of investment on marginal cost is not too large relative to the elasticity of the cost
function. If b were too large, every supplier would want to make i!1.
12Mixing customized and standardized inputs is a rather common practice, as for example Boehm and Obereld
(2018) document for Indian manufacturing plants.
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Fig. 1: Y-chain
specication is pedagogical, as will become clear in the analysis. More generally, the important
requisite is that the buyer must have the option of buying generics when negotiating with his
specialized supplier, because that establishes the threat point in the bargaining process.
Figure 1 illustrates the Y-shaped supply chain in this economy. To distinguish from the B-S
vertical chain, we use the term Y-chain when referring to the entire supply chain. The timing of
events is summarized as follows:
 Each B matches with a supplier S in either Foreign or ROW to form a vertical chain, adapting
their technologies toward each other within the chain;
 S makes an irreversible relationship-specic investment;
 B and S bargain over price and quantity of q;
 If bargaining is successful, trade of q takes place and payments are made; otherwise, q = 0
and S produces only generic inputs;
 B purchases g;
 Final production occurs and nal goods are sold.
Solving the game by backward induction, we rst carry out the analysis from the perspective
of a single vertical chain. We then solve for the equilibrium structure of matches.
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3 No Trade Agreement
When there is no trade agreement, all inputs imported into Home are subject to the tari¤ regardless
of their origin.
3.1 Single Partnership
After S chooses her investment, B and S determine the price of the specialized intermediate inputs,
psN , by Generalized Nash Bargaining over the surplus due to trading qN customized inputs instead of
only generic ones. Specically, let the supplier have bargaining power  2 (0; 1). Under Generalized
Nash Bargaining, the two rms choose psN to maximize
(UTB   U0B)(1 )(UTS   U0S),
where UJk is the veriable prot that rm k (either B or S) would receive under scenario J . The
two possible scenarios are either bargaining and trading (T ) or not reaching an agreement and thus
not trading (0). Those values are laid out as follows: UTB = V (Q
)   (pw + t)gN   (psN + t)qN ;
U0B = V (Q
)  (pw + t)Q; UTS = psNqN   C(qN ; i; !); U0S = 0.
Dening 
  (UTB  U0B)+ (UTS  U0S) as the bargaining surplus, the outcome of bargaining has
the two rms splitting the proceeds, with S receiving 
 and B receiving (1  )
, in addition to
their reservation payo¤, U0k . In the absence of a trade agreement,

N = pwqN   C(qN ; iN ; !). (2)
Conditional on investment i and on the tari¤, a B-S vertical chain trades the ex-post privately
optimal number of specialized inputs, qN , and B purchases the ex-post privately e¢ cient level of
generic inputs, gN . Together, they compose the total number of inputs purchased within the Y-
chain by B: Q = qN + gN . Since without a PTA both customized and generic inputs incur the
tari¤, privately optimal sourcing equalizes the marginal cost of the two alternative inputs,
Cq(qN ; i; !) = pw, (3)
11
pinning down qN (and hence gN ) for given i. Under our functional form specication, this condition
becomes
qN =
pw   ! + bi
c
. (4)
Now, anticipating the bargaining outcome, S chooses her investment by solving
max
iN

N   I(iN ).
Thus, equilibrium investment, iN , satises I
0(iN ) =  Ci(), or equivalently,
iN =

b
2c  b2

(pw   !) . (5)
Substituting (5) back in (4) and manipulating, we nd
qN =

2
b

b
2c  b2

(pw   !)
=

2
b

iN . (6)
Hence, the equilibrium investment and output are proportional. More productive (lower-!)
rms produce more for a given investment, and they also invest more, reinforcing their original
advantages. When the suppliers bargaining power () is very small, the investment is very low,
and drops to zero as  ! 0, when S does not appropriate any of the benets of her investment.
As  rises, both investment and production of specialized inputs increase. They are also positively
a¤ected by the e¤ectiveness of investment (b), but negatively a¤ected by the steepness of the
marginal cost curve (c). Observe also that neither investment nor production is a¤ected by the
tari¤, which in this setting distorts the total volume of inputs, Q, but does not interfere with the
sourcing of q.
It is useful to compare Ss investment choice with the e¢ cient level of investment, given the
tari¤. Under privately e¢ cient sourcing, worldwide social welfare due to this bilateral relationship
can be dened as
	N = V (Q
)  pwQ + pwqN   C(qN ; i; !)  I(i). (7)
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The e¢ cient level of investment (ie) maximizes (7). Under dual sourcing, the rst two terms of
(7) are una¤ected by the level of investment. Thus, using (3), it follows that e¢ ciency requires
I 0(ie) =  Ci(). (8)
Under our functional form specication, this yields
ie =

b
2c  b2

(pw   !) . (9)
Observe that, as b approaches
p
2c, the level of the e¢ cient investment blows up.13 Comparing
iN with i
e, it is immediate that iN < i
e (since  < 1). Moreover, it is easy to see that the
extent of the hold-up problem, which we can dene as HUPN  ie   iN , depends critically on the
productivity of the supplier:
Lemma 1 The extent of the hold-up problem in the absence of a trade agreement, HUPN , increases
with Ss productivity (i.e., as ! falls).
Proof. Using (5) and (9), we have that
HUPN = i
e   iN =
2bc (1  ) (pw   !)
(2c  b2) (2c  b2) ,
which is clearly decreasing in !.
Intuitively, this happens because actual investment increases with Ss share  of the bargaining
surplus, whereas the e¢ cient level of investment increases with the whole bargaining surplus. The
extent of the ine¢ ciency is therefore proportional to (1  ) 
N , but 
N is itself increasing in
productivity. Hence, it is precisely the vertical chains with the best suppliers who produce more
and generate higher surplus for any level of investment that are more negatively a¤ected by
contract incompleteness.
13 In this case, imax would obtain as a corner solution.
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We can solve for closed-form expressions for equilibrium prots conditional on !:
UNS (!) =
 (pw   !)2
2c  b2 , (10)
UNB (!) =
2c(1  ) (pw   !)2
(2c  b2)2 . (11)
Both are clearly decreasing in !, so low-! suppliers earn higher prots than high-! suppliers, and
a buyers prot is higher in a vertical chain with a low-! supplier.
3.2 Structure of Matches
Initially, suppliers and buyers are not specialized to each other. Each B matches with a supplier S
in either Foreign or ROW to form a vertical chain. We consider a Walrasian matching environment
where each supplier that matches with a buyer pays a (possibly negative) fee to her buyer, and
where the market for matches clears.
It is straightforward to show that matching follows a simple continuous assignment. Thus, we
leave technical details to the Appendix. Importantly, Walrasian equilibrium allocations and stable
outcomes coincide (Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame, 1992). That is, conditional on the equilibrium fees,
no buyer or supplier could earn strictly higher prots by breaking their current matches and forming
a new match with a new mutually-agreeable fee. Hence, we can use the intuitive logic of stability
to help describe equilibrium.
Feasibility requires that the measure of suppliers matched cannot exceed the measure of available
buyers (who are relatively scarce). Because all joint payo¤s are strictly decreasing in !, private
e¢ ciency requires that only the lowest-! suppliers in each market get matched in equilibrium.
Hence, denoting the hypothetical values for the cuto¤ levels of productivity in Foreign and ROW
by b!F and b!ROW , respectively, in a feasible equilibrium we must have the following market-clearing
condition:

Z b!F
0
dF (!) + (1  )
Z b!ROW
0
dF (!) = . (12)
Additionally, the marginal matches in Foreign and ROW must yield the same joint payo¤ to
the members of the partnership. As the distribution of suppliers is the same in the two markets,
and the joint future payo¤ of a B-S chain for a given ! is also equal in both markets in the absence
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of trade agreements, in equilibrium the marginal matches in each market must involve suppliers
with the same productivity:
b!F = b!ROW . (13)
Using those two conditions, we then have that equilibrium in the market for matches without
a PTA implies b!F = b!ROW = e!N , where e!N is determined by
F (e!N ) = . (14)
Observe that a larger Home (i.e., a higher ) implies a higher cuto¤ e!N , with buyers matching
further down in the productivity distribution. The relative size parameter  does not a¤ect the
distribution of productivity among suppliers that match.
Because all buyers are identical, each supplier is indi¤erent about the buyer to whom it is
matched and cares only about the size of the fee paid. Buyers care about both the size of the fee
and the suppliers productivity, which a¤ects the buyers ultimate prot. Equilibrium is achieved
when each buyer earns the same prot, so the fee must di¤er across matches. To see why, suppose
that there is just one fee. Then a buyer matched to a relatively low-productivity supplier would
earn a relatively low prot. He would prefer to match for a lower fee with a higher-productivity
supplier, and the higher-productivity supplier would also prefer this.
Hence, the fee paid to a buyer must depend upon the productivity of its matched supplier.
Specically, the equilibrium matching fee schedule is the same for matches with suppliers in Foreign
and ROW, and satises
MN (!) = U
N
S (e!N )  UNB (!)  UNB (e!N ) .
Note that all buyers earn UNB (!)+MN (!) = U
N
B (e!N )+UNS (e!N ) > 0, so their payo¤s are invariant
to !. This happens because, as a higher productivity of the matched supplier increases UNB (!), the
buyers fee decreases by exactly the same amount. In contrast, the cuto¤ supplier earns a payo¤
of exactly 0 but higher-productivity suppliers earn more, as they absorb the whole extra aggregate
surplus brought about by the higher productivity through a lower fee to the buyers.
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4 A Preferential Trade Agreement
Under a PTA, the tari¤ on goods traded between Home and Foreign is eliminated. Imports from
ROW still face tari¤ t, which is now the external tari¤ under the agreement, assumed unchanged.
Thus, t also represents the preferential margin o¤ered to imports coming from Foreign.
For vertical chains with suppliers in ROW before and after the PTA, the previous analysis
applies in its entirety; the changes are restricted to vertical chains with suppliers in Foreign and
to those where the buyer decides to change the location of his match. Since generic inputs remain
imported from ROW, they still cost pw + t for Homes buyers.
4.1 Single Partnership
Consider a vertical chain with a supplier located in Foreign. The total volume of inputs purchased
by B remains unchanged at Q, as pinned down by V 0(Q) = pw + t, but now its composition
changes to reect the new relative prices. This is summarized by
Cq(qP ; iP ; !) = pw + t, (15)
which under our functional form specication is equivalent to
qP =
pw + t  ! + bi
c
. (16)
Only one of the potential UJk payo¤ terms, U
T
B , structurally changes, becoming
UTB = V (Q
)  (pw + t)gP   psP qP .
The bargaining surplus under a trade agreement, 
P , is dened in the same manner as before, but
now reects the change in buyer prot with trade due to tari¤ savings when B sources from S:

P = (pw + t)qP   C(qP ; iP ; !).
Due to Generalized Nash Bargaining, B and S retain the same shares of 
P as they do without
a trade agreement. Accordingly, the investment decision is conceptually unchanged, being the
16
solution of
max
i

P   I(iP ).
The equilibrium level of investment under the PTA can then be expressed as
iP =

b
2c  b2

(pw + t  !) . (17)
Clearly, the preferential trade agreement induces an increase in relationship-specic investments.
We dene the change in investment due to the PTA as i  iP iN . Our quadratic specication
yields the useful property that it is proportional to the tari¤:14
i =

b
2c  b2

t.
The change in investment vanishes when ! 0 and is strictly increasing (at an increasing rate) in
. It also increases with the responsiveness of marginal cost to investment (b) and decreases with
the slope of the marginal cost curve (c).
The resulting equilibrium level of customized inputs remains proportional to investment,
qP =

2
b

iP , (18)
and therefore the e¤ect of the PTA on the number of customized inputs, q  qP   qN , also is
proportional to i:
q =

2
2c  b2

t
=

2
b

i.
Part of the increase in the quantity, tc , is due entirely to Ss advantage from not facing the
tari¤. This e¤ect takes place even if there were no additional investment. In particular, observe
that if the investment did not lower production cost (b = 0), the supplier would never invest and
yet sales of customized inputs would still increase, by q(b = 0) = tc > 0.
14The multiplicative constant in i is analogous to what we termed the "investment e¤ect" of a tari¤ in our
previous work in the context of nondiscriminatory liberalization (Ornelas and Turner 2008; 2012).
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Fig. 2: The E¤ects of a PTA on Sourcing and Production
The sales of specialized inputs increase also because of lower production costs. Under the PTA,
Ss investment enhances the bargaining surplus by more than it does without a trade agreement.
Since S keeps some of those gains, she has an incentive to increase her investment. When investment
is higher, Ss entire marginal cost curve is lower. There are then more units that, from an e¢ ciency
standpoint, should be produced by S. Such level, q1, satises Cq(q1; iP ; !) = pw. Developing this
expression under our functional form specication and using (4), we obtain
q1 = q

N +

b2
2c  b2

t
c
= qN +
b
c
i.
It is easy to see that
qP = q

1 +
t
c
.
That is, under the PTA S produces tc more units than it should, from an e¢ ciency standpoint.
Figure 2 highlights the e¤ects of the PTA within a single Y-chain. Units q 2 (0; qN ) are sold
regardless of whether there is a PTA. But due to the higher investment, there is extra bargaining
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surplus for each of those units, because Ss marginal cost is lower. This extra surplus is shown by
area C. Units q 2 (qN ; q1) are produced by S under the PTA, but not otherwise. They represent
trade driven by productivity growth. The additional surplus from those units is shown by area D.
The tc units produced by S under the PTA at a marginal cost higher than pw are those between q1
and qP . They reect classic trade diversion, as the extra customized inputs come at the expense of
generic inputs. That extra production leads to the deadweight loss shown by area E. Furthermore,
under a PTA there is also an additional investment cost (not shown in the gure), which reduces
the overall welfare gain.15
Interestingly, the PTA can lead to too much investment relative to the e¢ cient level. Recall
that, without the agreement, HUPN = ie   iN > 0 for sure. Such an unambiguous ordering does
not exist under the PTA. Dening the excess of investment under a PTA as EXCP  iP   ie,16
one nds that
EXCP > 0() (2c  b2)t > 2c(1  )(pw   !).
It follows that iP > i
e when  is su¢ ciently close to one (in which case the original hold-up problem
is relatively unimportant, so the investment boost due to the PTA is mostly distortionary) and/or
when t is su¢ ciently high (in which case the PTA is too e¤ective in encouraging investment).
Overall, this analysis highlights a "within Y-chain" tradeo¤between conventional trade/sourcing
diversion and an e¤ect that so far has been entirely neglected in the regionalism literature. Due
to the PTA, the chain creates additional surplus for all units of customized inputs that would
be produced without the agreement, plus some surplus for additional units traded areas C and
D in Figure 2. This increases welfare, possibly more than o¤setting the losses due to excessive
production (area E) and additional investment.
It is important to stress at this point that, while our model displays an e¤ect akin to Vinerian
trade diversion, Vinerian trade creation is shut down. Classic trade creation would be observed if
the PTA led to more total units traded, but Q is kept xed by design (for given t). Thus, if one
considered only traditional forces, one would deem the model designed to highlight the negative
15Observe that a change in parameter ! provokes a parallel shift of the marginal cost curve. It is easy to see that
such shift does not a¤ect the size of area E, which is therefore independent of the suppliers productivity. Similarly,
because the change in investment is also una¤ected by ! (see equation XXX), a lower ! causes the same parallel shift
of the two Cq curves in Figure 2. As a result, the size of area D is also independent of the suppliers productivity.
On the other hand, area C is decreasing in !, since a lower ! increases qN .
16 In the Appendix we show that the e¢ cient level of investment is the same under no agreement and under a PTA.
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welfare consequences of PTAs. Instead, it is designed to shed light on novel channels through which
PTAs a¤ect economic e¢ ciency.
With a PTA, we can solve for closed-form expressions for equilibrium prots conditional on !:
UPS (!; t) =
 (pw + t  !)2
2c  b2 , (19)
UPB (!; t) =
2c(1  ) (pw + t  !)2
(2c  b2)2 . (20)
Again, both are clearly decreasing in !.
Consider next a vertical chain with a supplier in ROW. As stated earlier, the "no PTA" analysis
applies in its entirety. The prots of the supplier and buyer are the same as in (10)-(11). Note that
these payo¤s are the same as in (19)-(20) with t = 0; i.e., UNS (!) = U
P
S (!; 0) and U
N
B (!) = U
P
B (!; 0):
We will generally use the UNS (!) and U
N
B (!) expressions when referring to prots from vertical
chains with suppliers in ROW. More generally, whenever we drop the t argument from a function,
that means that there is no discriminatory protection (t = 0) and equilibrium outcomes follow the
"no PTA" case.
4.2 Structure of Matches
Analogously to section 3.2, we rst describe the characteristics of the competitive matching equi-
librium and then discuss how the equilibrium is achieved. The market-clearing condition (12) is
unchanged with the PTA. And once again it su¢ ces to identify a condition requiring that the
marginal matches in Foreign and ROW yield the same joint payo¤ to the members of the vertical
chain. However, when Home forms a PTA with Foreign, a supplier with productivity ! generates
a higher aggregate payo¤ if she is located in Foreign. Simple inspection of (10), (11), (19) and (20)
makes clear that17
b!F = b!ROW + t. (21)
Using conditions (12) and (21), we then have that equilibrium in the market for matches under
17 If the external tari¤ were su¢ ciently high, we would have 
P (! + t) > 


N (!) for all !  0. In that case, all
buyers would match with suppliers in Foreign and e!ROW would be undened. Qualitatively, the analysis would be
very similar, but to avoid a taxonomy we concentrate on the case where there are matches in both locations.
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a PTA implies
F (e!ROW + t) + (1  )F (e!ROW ) = . (22)
This determines e!ROW . Using (21), we obtain e!F .
It is straightforward to see that e!N 2 (e!ROW ; e!F ). Hence, when Home forms a PTA with
Foreign, some buyers that would have matched with suppliers in ROW that are more productive
than e!N end up matched with suppliers in Foreign that are less productive than e!N . This di¤erence
is maximal when we consider the hypothetical lastbuyer to switch suppliers, who leaves a supplier
with productivity e!ROW in ROW for a supplier with productivity e!F in Foreign. Both matches
yield the same aggregate payo¤ for the vertical chains, as the di¤erence in productivity between
them is exactly o¤set by the (direct and indirect) benets from the tari¤ preference.
The equilibrium matching fee schedules for matches with suppliers in Foreign and ROW satisfy
MP;ROW (!) = U
N
S (e!ROW )  UNB (!)  UNB (e!ROW ) ,
MP;F (!) = U
P
S (e!F ; t)  UPB (!; t)  UPB (e!F ; t) .
As with equilibrium under no PTA, all buyers earn the same payo¤ of UNS (e!ROW ) + UNB (e!ROW ).
This is higher than the payo¤ of UNS (e!N ) +UNB (e!N ) that buyers earn under no PTA. Once again,
the cuto¤ suppliers earn a payo¤ of zero, while higher-productivity suppliers earn positive prots.
The most protable supplier is the ! = 0 supplier in Foreign.
Figure 3 illustrates the matching equilibrium. It shows equations (12), (13) and (21) for hy-
pothetical values of the cuto¤ levels of productivity in Foreign and ROW, b!F and b!ROW . The
equilibrium cuto¤ e!N satises (12) and (13) for the no-PTA case, while e!F and e!ROW satisfy (12)
and (21) for the PTA case. The downward-sloping function is implied by (12). As b!ROW increases,
there are more vertical chains formed with suppliers in ROW. Hence, the number of vertical chains
formed with suppliers in Foreign must fall. When b!ROW = b!F , it follows that F (b!ROW ) = , so
this yields e!N .
Comparative statics follow directly from the gure. A higher external tari¤ t shifts equation
(21) upwards. This increases the PTA cuto¤ in Foreign, e!F , and decreases the PTA cuto¤ in
ROW, e!ROW . Intuitively, a higher tari¤ drives a bigger wedge between the productivities of the
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Fig. 3: Matching Equilibrium with and without the PTA
suppliers in the marginal re-match. The productivity of the last supplier lost in ROW rises, while
the productivity of the last supplier gained in Foreign falls.
A larger Home (higher ) shifts each point of the downward-sloping function upwards, yielding
higher e!N , e!ROW and e!F . Intuitively, with more buyers, the productivity of the marginal supplier
falls in all jurisdictions with and without a PTA.
Now consider the e¤ect of Foreign becoming small relative to ROW. This is represented by a
fall in . In that case, e!N does not change, because the cuto¤s under no PTA do not depend on the
relative size of Foreign. But the cuto¤s under the PTA do change. The downward-sloping function
pivots around the b!F = b!ROW = e!N point and becomes steeper, while the y-axis intercept F 1 
rises. The cuto¤s e!F and e!ROW both rise.18 However, note that the decrease in the cuto¤ in ROW
induced by the PTA, e!N   e!ROW , becomes smaller as  falls, while the counterpart increase in the
cuto¤ in Foreign induced by the PTA, e!F   e!N , gets larger as  falls. Intuitively, under a lower
 suppliers in Foreign become relatively more scarce, so the PTA induces suppliers lower down in
the productivity distribution to form vertical chains with buyers.
18Mathematically, the e¤ect of a higher  is de!ROW
d
= F (e!ROW ) F (e!ROW+t)
f(e!ROW+t)+(1 )f(e!ROW ) < 0.
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5 The Welfare Consequences of a PTA
We can express the welfare generated by a single Y-chain without a trade agreement and under a
PTA as, respectively,19
	N (!) = [V (Q
)  pwQ] + pwqN   C(qN ; iN )  I(iN ) and (23)
	P (!; t) = [V (Q
)  pwQ] + pwqP   C(qP ; iP )  I(iP ). (24)
The rst bracketed term is identical in the two expressions and reects the fact that, by design,
consumer welfare from the nal good remains constant regardless of whether a PTA obtains. Hence,
the PTA has no e¤ect on it. The other terms of 	i(!) denote the surplus including governments
tari¤ revenue created when a vertical chain forms under trade regime i, relative to the surplus
B would generate if he only bought generic inputs from ROW. Observe that, in the limiting case
where the tari¤ is very small, limt!0	P = 	N . We denote the welfare impact of the PTA due to
a single Y-chain where the supplier has parameter ! by 	(!; t)  	P (!; t) 	N (!).
We obtain the total welfare impact of a PTA by aggregating the e¤ects over all Y-chains.
Welfare without trade agreements is given by
WN =
Z e!N
0
	N (!)dF (!),
while welfare under a PTA satises
WP = 
Z e!F (t)
0
	P (!; t)dF (!) + (1  )
Z e!ROW (t)
0
	N (!)dF (!).
We can then express the aggregate welfare impact of a PTA, W () WP  WN ; as
W () = 
Z e!N
0
	(!; t)dF (!)| {z }
incumbent supplier e¤ ect: IS()
+
"

Z e!F (t)
e!N 	P (!; t)dF (!)  (1  )
Z e!N
e!ROW (t)	N (!)dF (!)
#
| {z }
new supplier e¤ ect: NS()
.
(25)
The rst term of (25) corresponds to the welfare impact of the PTA for all Y-chains with
specialized suppliers in Foreign, and where the B   S vertical chain forms both with and without
19 In the Appendix we show these expressions under the functional forms we adopted.
23
the PTA. We refer to this as the aggregate incumbent supplier e¤ect, and denote it by IS(). The
term in brackets corresponds to the welfare impact due to the reallocation of buyers from vertical
chains with suppliers from ROW (outside the PTA) to vertical chains with suppliers from Foreign
(inside the PTA). We refer to this as the aggregate new supplier e¤ect, and denote it by NS().
We can then write W () = IS() +NS().
For expositional reasons, it is best to investigate expression (25) in parts. In subsection 5.1 we
analyze the welfare consequences of a PTA for an incumbent supplier in Foreign where the suppliers
productivity ! is arbitrary. From subsection 5.2 onwards we then consider the aggregate welfare
impact of the PTA across all !, taking into account changes in the set of Y-chains. However,
to distinguish across various forces, we rst consider the case where  = 1. In that case, there
are no new vertical chains, so NS(1) = 0 and W (1) = IS(1). We can think of that as the
limiting situation of cases where the preferential partner is very large, e.g., the US for Mexico
within NAFTA. Or more generally, it can represent (the extreme version of) cases where the PTA
members are strong natural partners, perhaps due to geographical remoteness, as for example
Australia and New Zealand. Analytically, setting  = 1 allows us to keep the set of vertical chains
unchanged by the PTA. In subsection 5.3 we focus instead on the extensive margin e¤ects of
the PTA, highlighting how changes in the set of vertical chains due to the PTA inuences its total
welfare impact. That is, we analyze NS() in isolation. Finally, in subsection 5.4 we analyze
W () for general .
5.1 Single Partnership
Within a given incumbent vertical chain, a PTA induces an increase in the sourcing of specialized
inputs, coupled with changes in the cost of producing them and an increase in the cost of investment
incurred by S. It is instructive to split 	(!; t) into two e¤ects, relationship strengthening (	R)
and sourcing diversion (	S), with 	(!; t) = 	R +	S .
The relationship-strengthening e¤ect reects the welfare consequences of the PTA on the (ex-
ante) investment decisions while assuming that, given the investment, the (ex-post) sourcing de-
cision would be socially e¢ cient. It corresponds to the additional surplus created by Ss extra
investment on the production of q1 i.e., the reduction in specialized input cost relative to the cost
from using generic inputs in the production of the ex-post socially e¢ cient level q1, illustrated by
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areas C+D in Figure 2 net of the increased investment cost. Specically,
	R = pw(q

1   qN ) + [C(qN ; iN )  C(q1; iP )]  [I(iP )  I(iN )]. (26)
After some manipulation, this expression can be rewritten as
	R =
2c  b2
2c
i (HUPN   EXCP ) . (27)
Expression (27) is very intuitive. There is underinvestment in the absence of trade agreements
(HUPN > 0), and the increase in investment (i > 0) mitigates that original ine¢ ciency. The
rst term in parenthesis reects the ensuing welfare gains from moving the suppliers investment
toward the rst-best level. However, i may be too large and yield overinvestment under a PTA,
in which case EXCP > 0. The second term in parenthesis reects the welfare losses from inducing
the supplier to invest above the rst-best level. The sign of 	R depends upon which of those two
gaps is more egregious. Naturally, if the underinvestment problem remains present under the PTA
despite the extra investment, then EXCP < 0 and 	R > 0 for sure.
It also follows from expression (27) that 	R is non-monotonic in i. When i is small,
the relationship-strengthening e¤ect is positive and increasing in i. But when i is very high,
HUPN   EXCP < 0 and an increase in i amplies the distortion in investment spending.
In turn, the sourcing-diversion e¤ect reects the welfare consequences of the PTA due to dis-
tortions in sourcing decisions i.e. the deadweight loss from using customized inputs that are too
costly given the investment choice under the PTA. This is the direct result of the protection the
tari¤ preference a¤ords S by skewing the sourcing decision away from generic inputs. Explicitly,
	S = C(q

1; i

P )  C(qP ; iP ) + pw(qP   q1)
=   t
2
2c
. (28)
This corresponds to (the negative of) area E in Figure 2 a triangle with base (qP   q1) = tc and
height t:
A single Y-chain generates higher welfare under a PTA provided that the relationship-strengthening
e¤ect is positive and dominates the sourcing diversion e¤ect, i.e., 	R  j	S j. This compari-
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son highlights a tradeo¤ between improvements in the e¢ ciency of the production process (	R)
versus tari¤-induced allocative ine¢ ciency (	S).
A key determinant of the balance of this tradeo¤ is the suppliers (inverse) productivity para-
meter, !, which shifts her marginal cost function. From Lemma 1 we have that @HUPN@! < 0. And it
is straightforward to see that
@EXCP@!  = @HUPN@! . It follows that productivity has a higher impact
on the e¢ cient level of investment than on the privately chosen level of i at any trade regime.
Therefore, taking the partial derivative of (27), we nd
@	R
@!
=
2c  b2
c
i
@HUPN
@!
< 0. (29)
This implies that the potential e¢ ciency-enhancing aspect of a PTA is unambiguously more impor-
tant for more productive suppliers (which have a lower !). The key force behind this result is that
the ine¢ ciency brought about by contractual incompleteness is increasing in productivity. Thus,
when cost-reducing investment rises with the PTA, it brings a greater welfare benet for low-!
suppliers.
The sourcing-diversion e¤ect, on the other hand, does not change with !. Since neither the level
of productivity nor investment a¤ects the slope of the marginal cost curve, the implied deadweight
loss is a constant function of both. The upshot is that, for a given Y-chain, the downside of a PTA
is una¤ected by the productivity of the specialized supplier, whereas the upside rises with it. Thus,
we have that:
Lemma 2 Higher supplier productivity induces a stronger relationship-strengthening e¤ect, but has
no impact on the sourcing-diversion e¤ect of a Preferential Trade Agreement. Hence, 	(!; t) is
decreasing in !:
A central element behind Lemma 2 is that only the slope (and not the level) of the marginal
cost curve a¤ects the sourcing-diversion e¤ect. Since productivity only shifts that curve vertically,
productivity does not inuence the extent of sourcing diversion.
An implication of Lemma 2 is that, considering a single partnership, the PTA raises welfare
(	R +	S  0) if
!  pw  

2c  2b2 + 2b2
2(1  )b2

t  !. (30)
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Observe that, since 2c > b2, the expression in brackets is strictly positive. Furthermore, note that !
is negative if t is su¢ ciently high. In that case, there are no Y-chains for which the PTA enhances
welfare. We therefore have that:
Lemma 3 If
t >

2(1  )b2
2c  2b2 + 2b2

pw  t, (31)
then the PTA lowers welfare for all existing Y-chains.
Proof. If condition (31) holds, ! < 0. Hence, the PTA lowers welfare for all existing Y-chains.
Lemma 3 places some bounds on the benets of a PTA stemming from the relationship-
strengthening e¤ect. Specically, the PTA is unable to raise welfare due to a given vertical chain if
the margin of preference is too high. Similarly, if suppliersbargaining power  is either very high
or very low, the potential for the PTA to raise welfare is severely limited, in the sense of placing
tight bounds on t. An analogous point can be made for very low levels of b.
On the other hand, if the external tari¤ is su¢ ciently small, then the net within-chain impact
of a PTA is necessarily positive. See the Appendix for the proof.
Lemma 4 The within-chain impact of a PTA is positive when the external tari¤ is very small:
d	(!;t)
dt (t = 0) > 0.
Hence, if the external tari¤ is su¢ ciently small, the rst-order gain from the relationship-
strengthening e¤ect dominates the second-order loss from the sourcing-diversion e¤ect within an
existing Y-chain.
5.2 Aggregate Welfare Impact when Foreign is Large ( = 1)
When  = 1, e!ROW = e!F = e!N . The PTA a¤ects only vertical chains where Foreign suppliers
are matched with or without the PTA. The entire welfare e¤ect is due to those incumbent vertical
chains, and equation (25) reduces to simply
W (1) = IS(1) =
Z e!N
0
	(!; t)dF (!). (32)
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In that case, the PTA a¤ects welfare only through the relationship-strengthening and the sourcing-
diversion e¤ects, aggregated over all existing Y-chains. We term the aggregate e¤ects due to those
two forces RS and SD, respectively. We know from the previous analysis that SD < 0 but that in
general the sign of RS is ambiguous.
Now, since Lemma 2 shows that 	(!; t) decreases with !, it follows immediately that, if
e!N  !, then W (1) > 0. That is, if the PTA is not harmful even through the marginal active
vertical chain, then it is overall helpful for sure. In that case, the distribution of active suppliers
is restricted to those for which the welfare impact of the PTA is positive. If instead e!N > !, then
whether the PTA helps or hurts in aggregate hinges on the whole distribution of productivity of
the active specialized suppliers.
Because of Lemma 2 we can, however, rank distributions. In particular, let us say that F2(!)
FOSD F1(!) when distribution F2(!) rst-order stochastically dominates distribution F1(!). In
that case, we have that a PTA yields better welfare consequences under F1(!) than under F2(!).
See the Appendix for the proof.
Proposition 1 If F2(!) FOSD F1(!), then W (1;F1) > W (1;F2).
Proposition 1 implies that, in the context of global sourcing, a PTA enhances welfare provided
that the distribution of active specialized suppliers is su¢ ciently concentrated on high-productivity
suppliers, but not otherwise. A corollary is that, if one were able to identify a distribution F0(!)
under which a PTA would be welfare-neutral, one would know that the agreement would be socially
desirable under all distributions that are betterthan F0(!), in the sense of being rst-order sto-
chastically dominated by F0(!), and undesirable under all distributions with the opposite property.
Proposition 1 could also be used as a guide for industry exclusion within a PTA. If one could rank
industries within a PTA using a FOSD criterion (which should generally be related to measures
of comparative advantage), then an optimal exclusioncriterion would indicate that all industries
j such that Fj(!) FOSD F0(!) should be excluded from the agreement, whereas all industries i
such that F0(!) FOSD Fi(!) should be integral parts of it.
Now, a central element determining the social desirability of a PTA is the level of the external
tari¤, which denes the extent of preferential treatment for matches in Foreign. It a¤ects RS and
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SD di¤erently.20
While in general the e¤ect of a higher external tari¤ is ambiguous, we know what happens at
the extremes. Lemma 3 states that, if t is too high, then a PTA lowers welfare through all existing
Y-chains and is therefore denitely harmful. Yet if the external tari¤ is su¢ ciently small, then
it follows from Lemma 4 that a PTA raises welfare through all existing Y-chains and is therefore
surely benecial. Indeed, we will see that the e¤ect of t on W (1) is non-monotonic.
On one hand, sourcing diversion is a very simple function of the external tari¤, monotonically
increasing with t at an increasing rate. On the other hand, the relationship-strengthening e¤ect is
more nuanced. For a given Y-chain, it is positive for su¢ ciently low t, initially rises, but eventually
falls with t.
For very low t, SD is second-order small, so RS dominates. But because the tari¤ is small,
the change in investment is also small, and so is RS. Thus, the e¤ects of the PTA are minor. As t
increases, i increases. For relatively low levels of t, the welfare gain from a PTA rises with t. For
su¢ ciently high t, however, the increase in RS is more than o¤set by a fall in SD, and the welfare
gain from a PTA falls with the external tari¤. Thus, for any distribution of !, there is a maximum
level of t that is consistent with welfare-improving PTAs. See the Appendix for the proof.
Proposition 2 When  = 1, the welfare impact of a PTA has an inverted-U shape with respect
to the external tari¤. It is strictly positive when the external tari¤ is su¢ ciently close to zero, is
maximized when t = t^, where t^ corresponds to
t^  (1  )b
2 [pw  E (!;!  e!N )]
2c  2b2 + 2b2 , (33)
and is strictly negative when t > 2t^.
Hence, there is a level of preferential margin t^ that optimally trades o¤ the gains from RS
against the losses from SD.21 The same factors that determine t^ also determine the highest level
of preferential margin under which a PTA can be benecial, which here is simply 2t^. Both are
20Naturally, the tari¤ also a¤ects welfare through the conventional mechanism of ine¢ ciently lowering the total
volume of traded inputs, Q. However, under dual sourcing with and without the PTA, that e¤ect is unchanged by
the agreement.
21Observe that E (!;!  e!N ) is fully determined by the distribution of ! and by parameter , so t^ is a function
of primitives only.
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Fig. 4: Densities for k = 1 and k = 2
an increasing function of the average productivity of the active specialized suppliers [i.e., t^ rises
as E (!;!  e!N ) falls]. This happens because, when suppliers are more productive, the original
hold-up problem is more severe (Lemma 1), so it pays (from a social perspective) to have a higher
margin of preference to boost RS. It is also intuitive that a higher b generates a greater t^, since b
represents the sensitivity of marginal cost to investment, which is boosted by the external tari¤.
Example 1 To illustrate both propositions, consider that fundamental productivity 1=! follows a
Pareto distribution with lower distribution bound 1=pw and shape parameter k  1. This yields
F (!) =

!
pw
k
for ! 2 [0; pw]. Consider then the distributions for k = 1; 2, Fk1(!) = !pw
and Fk2(!) =

!
pw
2
. Fk1(!) corresponds to a uniform distribution. It is obvious that Fk2(!)
FOSD Fk1(!). Equilibrium cuto¤s are e!N1 = pw and e!N2 = ppw, and E (!;!  e!N1) <
E (!;!  e!N2). Figure 4 shows the two densities, while Figure 5 shows W (1) for each of them
as a function of the tari¤.22 Following Proposition 1, W (1) is higher for every t under Fk1(!).
Following Proposition 2, for both distributions W (1) is an inverted-U with respect to t, is strictly
positive for small external tari¤s, and is strictly negative for tari¤s more than twice as large the
tari¤ that maximizes it. Furthermore, the peak of W (1) obtains for a higher t under Fk1(!).
22Figure 5 assumes pw = c = 1, b = 1:25 and  =  = 0:5. There is nothing special about this parametrization.
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Fig. 5: W ( = 1) for k = 1 and k = 2
5.3 The New Supplier E¤ect
In the previous subsection we analyzed in detail the incumbent supplier e¤ect of a PTA when  = 1.
The general IS() is simply IS(1). Hence, if  < 1 the analysis of that term remains the same,
but the welfare impact is of lower magnitude. The remaining part of the welfare impact is the new
supplier e¤ect, NS(), to which we turn now.
The new supplier e¤ect is dened as
NS()  
Z e!F (t)
e!N 	P (!; t)dF (!)  (1  )
Z e!N
e!ROW (t)	N (!)dF (!). (34)
The rst term measures welfare generated by suppliers in Foreign that join vertical chains under
the PTA but not without a PTA. The second term measures welfare generated by "old" suppliers
in ROW that join vertical chains under no PTA but do not join vertical chains under a PTA. This
term enters negatively because those suppliers are e¤ectively replaced after the agreement. The
new supplier e¤ect is complicated because there is both a change in the distribution of supplier
productivity and a set of new investment levels due to the tari¤ preference under the PTA. The
productivity cuto¤s e!ROW (t) and e!F (t) are di¤erent from the old cuto¤ e!N that obtains in ROW
and Foreign under no PTA, and welfare 	P (t; !) depends upon the new levels of investment.
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To simplify the analysis, it is useful to express NS() in a slightly di¤erent form:
NS()  
Z e!F (t)
e!N 	(!; t)dF (!)
+
"

Z e!F (t)
e!N 	N (!; t)dF (!)  (1  )
Z e!N
e!ROW (t)	N (!)dF (!)
#
. (35)
The rst term of (35) is similar to IS(), except that it covers vertical chains with supplier produc-
tivity ! 2 (e!N ; e!F ] instead of ! 2 [0; e!N ]. The second (bracketed) term is fundamentally di¤erent.
It represents the welfare consequences of the PTA due to the changes in the set of vertical chains,
stripped from the within-Y-chain changes induced by the elimination of tari¤s on imports from
Foreign. We term it the matching diversion e¤ect, and denote it as MD(). The following result
shows that it is always negative. See the Appendix for the proof.
Proposition 3 For any t > 0, the matching diversion e¤ect due to a PTA is negative.
Because of the tari¤ preference, some buyers with less-than-great matches in ROW rematch
in Foreign. The new vertical chains include worse suppliers than the original ones. Hence, if we
disregard the changes in investment and production due to the tari¤ preferences, this ine¢ cient
reallocation of suppliers across vertical chains necessarily lowers global welfare.
Now, the tari¤ preference could induce socially benecial changes in investment and production
that outweigh the matching diversion e¤ect, as we illustrate later in this subsection. But it turns
out that this can occur only under fairly special conditions tari¤s need to be low and the density
of suppliers needs to be such that the magnitude of the matching diversion e¤ect is also low. For
ease of exposition, we rst identify two su¢ cient conditions for NS() < 0; one on the tari¤ and
another on the density. We then identify the pair of conditions necessary for NS() > 0; and
introduce an example highlighting them.
Consider the tari¤. If it is too high, then changes in investment fail to yield a positive welfare
e¤ect for the cuto¤ supplier under no PTA, e!N . Specically, for any tari¤ high enough so that
	(e!N ; t)  0; Lemma 2 implies that all "new" suppliers (! 2 (e!N ; e!F (t)]) generate lower welfare
under the PTA and the rst term in (35) is surely negative. It follows that the whole new supplier
e¤ect must be negative in that case. See the Appendix for the proof.
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Proposition 4 If t  2(1 )b
2[pw F 1()]
2c 2b2+2b2  tNS, then the new supplier e¤ect is negative.
If t < tNS , then 	(e!N ; t) > 0 and the rst term in (35) may be positive. But this is by no
means su¢ cient for NS() > 0. Indeed, for certain densities of suppliers, the matching diversion
e¤ect dominates for any t.
To analyze the role played by the density, it is helpful to delve deeper into the mechanics of
supplier reallocation. Intuitively, for tari¤ t; there is a reallocation of buyers from vertical chains with
ROW suppliers (! 2 [e!ROW (t); e!N ]) to vertical chains with Foreign suppliers (! 2 [e!N ; e!F (t)]).
For a small change in the tari¤ from t to t + dt; the cuto¤ supplier e!ROW (t) falls, the cuto¤
supplier e!F (t) rises, and an additional number of supplier reallocations occur. The exact measure
of reallocations induced by the increase dt is a function of both the density of cuto¤ suppliers in
ROW, f(e!ROW (t)); and the density of cuto¤ suppliers in Foreign, (1  )f(e!F (t)).
To make it easy to think about this measure, we call it the ow rate of reallocations. We can
derive a precise expression for this ow rate by using a change of variables to rewrite (34) as:23
NS() =
Z t
0
[	P (e!F (x); t) 	N (e!ROW (x))](x; ; F )dx: (36)
The new argument x is a hypothetical tari¤ that a¤ects only the (monotonic) cuto¤s e!ROW (x) ande!F (x), whereas the actual external tari¤ t a¤ects the investment and sourcing decisions. We call
the term in brackets the reallocation function:
r(x; t)  	P (e!F (x); t) 	N (e!ROW (x)):
The reallocation function captures the change in welfare due to a buyer who, induced by a tari¤
preference of size x, abandons a vertical chain with supplier e!ROW (x) in ROW and forms a new
one with supplier e!F (x) in Foreign, but invests and produces according to external tari¤ t.
In turn, the function (x; ; F ) captures precisely the ow rate of buyers that (due to the PTA)
move from vertical chains with ROW suppliers with productivity e!ROW (x) to new vertical chains
23See the Appendix for the derivation of this expression.
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with Foreign suppliers with productivity e!F (x). Specically, we have
(x; ; F )  (1  )f(e!F (x))f(e!ROW (x))
f(e!F (x)) + (1  )f(e!ROW (x)) .
The ow rate is the product of the densities of the ROW and Foreign cuto¤ suppliers, divided by
the weighted average of the two densities.
The total e¤ect NS() aggregates the reallocation function over all supplier reallocations that
occur under the PTA according to the weights (x; ; F ). We now state a monotonicity condition.
Condition 1 The ow rate (x; ; F ) is weakly increasing in x.
Condition 1 implies that, as the tari¤ increases, the ow rate of reallocations (weakly) increases.
For a continuously di¤erentiable density, this is equivalent to assuming that
(1  )f(e!ROW (x))3f 0(e!F (x))  f(e!F (x))3f 0(e!ROW (x))  0.
With a uniform distribution, fk1(!) = 1pw , the ow rate of new reallocations is constant and satises
Condition 1 for any  and t. The condition is restrictive, however. For other distributions, such as
fk2(!) =
2!
p2w
, it is often the case that it holds for some  and t; but not all. Still, if Condition 1
holds, then NS() < 0 regardless of t. See the Appendix for the formal proof.
Proposition 5 Under Condition 1, NS() < 0 for any positive t.
Intuitively, if the ow rate of reallocations rises with the size of the tari¤, then there are relatively
more reallocations at the margin than inframarginally. As a result, any welfare improvement from
higher investments is dominated by welfare losses due to matching diversion.
We provide here a sketch of the proof, which rests on two observations: (1) For t = 0, NS() = 0;
and (2) under Condition 1, NS() is decreasing and concave. The rst observation is obvious, so
let t be positive. For relatively e¢ cient reallocations, x is near 0. At x = 0, the welfare e¤ect
r(0; t) = 	P (e!N ; t)   	N (e!N ) = 	(e!N ) is the same as the welfare impact of the PTA due to
the marginal no-PTA supplier e!N , and may be positive or negative. But as x increases, r(x; t)
unambiguously falls.
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Lemma 5 The reallocation function is decreasing in x.
Proof. Di¤erentiating, we have
dr(x; t)
dx
=
d	P (e!F (x; ); t)
de!F de!Fdx   	N (e!ROW (x; ))de!ROW de!ROWdx ,
which is negative because d	P (e!F (x);t)de!F < 0; de!Fdx > 0; 	N (e!ROW (x))de!ROW < 0 and de!ROWdx < 0.
Intuitively, as x increases, the productivity of the old ROW supplier e!ROW (x) improves and
the productivity of the new Foreign supplier e!F (x) worsens. Hence, the productivity gap between
old and new suppliers grows with x. This lowers the welfare e¤ect of reallocation for two reasons:
directly, as a lower-productivity supplier generates less social surplus under any given trade regime;
and indirectly, because we know from Lemma 2 that the relationship-strengthening e¤ects of a PTA
is weaker for lower-productivity suppliers.
We also have that, at x = t, r(t; t) is unambiguously negative. At that point, the net joint
prots generated with supplier e!F (t) in Foreign under the PTA and with supplier e!ROW (t) in
ROW without the PTA are the same. Since the di¤erence between social welfare and joint prots
is tari¤ revenue (which unambiguously falls with the PTA), r(t; t) represents lost tari¤ revenue
under the PTA, evaluated for the least productive new Foreign supplier that forms a vertical chain:
 tqP (e!F (t)). Hence, the matching process induces welfare losses for sure at the margin, even after
accounting for potentially benecial changes in investment.
Now, if the ow rate of new matches with productivity near e!N is the same as the ow rate
of new matches with suppliers with productivity near e!F , then the negative e¤ects due to the
latter group of rematches will dominate and make NS() < 0. Under Condition 1, the ow rate is
non-decreasing in the tari¤. Hence, the negative e¤ects receive higher weight than the (possibly)
positive e¤ects. It then follows that NS() is decreasing and concave in t.
Figure 6 illustrates the reallocation function and its relationship to	(!). For this comparison,
it is helpful to change variables in the r function once more. We can write
NS() = 
Z e!F (t)
e!N r(!; t)dF (!),
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Fig. 6: Welfare E¤ects and the Reallocation Function
where
r(!; t)  	P (!; t) 	N (e!ROW (!))
shows, for an arbitrary external tari¤ t, the welfare impact of the PTA due to each reallocation
to ! in Foreign from e!ROW (!) in ROW. For !  e!N , 	(!; t) denotes the impact due to each
incumbent supplier in Foreign. Because of Lemma 2, this function is decreasing in !. The whole
IS() aggregates over 	(!; t) from 0 to e!N according to the density f(!).
The dashed line is the welfare impact that the PTA would have for suppliers distributed over
(e!N ; e!F ] if they were incumbent. But they are not. Instead, they replace suppliers distributed over
[e!ROW ; e!N ) previously matched in ROW. The di¤erence between the dashed line and the solid line
to the right of e!N represents the loss due to matching diversion. This e¤ect is negligible for the
very rst rematches, but grows large as reallocation continues. As t rises, the r(!; t) portion of the
curve necessarily lengthens, since e!F increases with t. The whole NS() aggregates over r(!; t)
from e!N to e!F .
Unlike our analysis of IS(), it is not straightforward to use rst-order stochastic dominance to
rank new supplier e¤ects. The reason is that the "worse" distribution of productivity could have
a low-magnitude new supplier e¤ect [if the density is very low between e!ROW (t) and e!F (t)], while
the "better" distribution could have a severely negative new supplier e¤ect [if the density happens
to be very high around e!ROW (t) and e!F (t)]. We can still make inferences, though. For example,
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in comparing new supplier e¤ects NS2() and NS1() for distributions where all that is known is
that F2(!) FOSD F1(!), we could have that NS2() < 0 for all F2(!) densities while NS1() > 0
for some F1(!). But the opposite would be impossible.
Observe that, in the example displayed in Figure 6, 	(e!N ) > 0. This implies that every
incumbent supplier contributes more to social welfare under the PTA than otherwise. It also
implies that NS() can be positive. Propositions 4 and 5 imply the following necessary condition.
Corollary 1 The new supplier e¤ect is positive only if t < tNS and the ow rate (x; ; F ) is
strictly decreasing for some x.
Intuitively, if Condition 1 fails to hold, then NS() may be convex in t for some range of t and
can be positive.24 The next example illustrates that, for a given set of parameters and for a given
tari¤ (below tNS), we can always construct a density such that NS() is positive.
Example 2 Let t < tNS,  = 12 and
fPU (!) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 2b"
1 2b" if ! 2 [0; pw   b")
 if ! 2 [pw   b"; pw + b"]
1 2b"
1 2b" if ! 2 (pw + b"; pw]
,
where  2  0; 12b" and
b" = t 2pw(1  )(1  )b2   t 2c  2b2 + 2b2
[4pw(1  )(2c  2b2) + 2t(1  )b2] > 0:
This distribution is piecewise uniform, with three di¤erent regions. Equilibrium matching yields
e!ROW (t) = pw   t2 in the low-! region of f(!), e!N = pw in the center of the middle-! region,
and e!F (t) = pw + t2 in the high-! region. This specication is constructed specically so that
r(e!N + b"; t) = 0. Then
NS

1
2

=
1
2
"

Z e!N+b"
e!N r(!; t)d! +

1  2b"
1  2b"
Z e!F
e!N+b" r(!; t)d!
#
.
24Condition 1 addresses one of many terms in the second derivative of NS() with respect to t. It is frequently
the case that other terms overwhelm the e¤ects of a decreasing ow rate. For example, NS() < 0 and is strictly
concave under the Pareto (k = 2) distribution of Example 1, even though it does not (always) satisfy Condition 1.
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Fig. 7: A Distribution that Yields a Positive New Supplier E¤ect
It follows that
R e!N+b"e!N r(!; t)d! > 0 and R e!Fe!N+b" r(!; t)d! < 0. Hence, for  su¢ ciently close to 12b" ,
the new supplier e¤ect is positive. Figure 7 highlights the intuition. If the density of idle suppliers
(under no PTA) in Foreign is very high for supplier reallocations very close to e!N , and this density
is very low for other supplier reallocations, then it is possible to have a positive new supplier e¤ect.
Compare Figure 7 with Figure 4. The density fPU (!) distorts fk1(!), allocating more density neare!N and less density near e!ROW and e!F . But it does not alter the equilibrium cuto¤s e!ROW ; e!N ande!F . Essentially, this reects a situation where: (1) Foreign has a large number of suppliers with
productivity near e!N that are idle without the PTA, but relatively few less-productive idle suppliers;
and (2) most ROW suppliers that are replaced also have productivity near e!N .
Note that in this example, if t > tNS, then no positive b" exists and it is impossible to construct
a density that yields NS() > 0.
5.4 The General Case
We now consider the general case. The welfare consequences of the PTA comprise the sum of the
aggregate incumbent supplier e¤ect and the aggregate new supplier e¤ect.
The sign of IS() depends on the balance between the relationship-strengthening and the
sourcing-diversion e¤ects over all existing vertical chains in Foreign, as discussed in subsection 5.2.
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The same analysis applies to the rst component of NS() in equation (35) for the vertical chains
that are formed in Foreign because of the PTA. Thus, its sign depends on the same forces that
shape the rst term. On the other hand, the second component of NS() in equation (35) the
matching diversion e¤ect is necessarily negative.
In general, then, a PTA in the context of global sourcing will raise aggregate welfare when
incumbent supplier e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong relative to any negative new supplier e¤ects. While
the net e¤ect of those forces will in general be ambiguous keeping up with the tradition of the
regional integration literature there are forces that tilt the balance in one direction or the other.
As discussed in the previous subsection, when  < 1 the welfare e¤ect of the PTA is not
necessarily higher for a better distribution of productivity. When we consider the e¤ects of tari¤s
on W (), however, some of the results from the "large partner" ( = 1) case go through. First,
for a su¢ ciently low tari¤, the total e¤ect is unambiguously positive. Basically, the aggregate
incumbent supplier e¤ect is always positive for a su¢ ciently low t, while the aggregate new supplier
e¤ect is negligible for very low t. Second, the welfare e¤ect of the PTA is negative if the tari¤ is
su¢ ciently high. For the tari¤ such that IS() = 0, t = 2t^, it is always true that if  < 1, then
NS() < 0. Hence, the range of tari¤s such that the PTA enhances welfare is smaller when  < 1.
See the Appendix for the proof.
Proposition 6 For any  < 1, there exists a t > 0 such that if t < t, then the PTA enhances
aggregate welfare. Also, there exists a t 2 [t; 2t^) such that if t > t, then the PTA lowers aggregate
welfare. Under Condition 1, t = t is unique.
An immediate implication of Proposition 6 is that, if the PTA in this context lowers aggregate
welfare, it is because the external tari¤ a policy variable that could potentially also be changed
with the agreement is too high.25
For t 2 (t; t) when Condition 1 fails to hold, either of the aggregate e¤ects may be positive
or negative, but their signs are linked through the welfare e¤ect of the PTA due to the marginal
incumbent supplier. This is both the lowest possible welfare e¤ect among incumbent suppliers,
	(e!N ; t), and the highest possible reallocation e¤ect, r(0; t). If that term is positive, then the
25 In fact, Crivelli (2016) shows empirically that external tari¤s tend to fall upon the formation of free trade
agreements especially when they are initially high.
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welfare e¤ect is positive for all incumbent suppliers and IS() > 0. If it is negative, then the
reallocation function is negative for all supplier reallocations and NS() < 0. We can conclude
that, if IS() < 0, then we must have 	(e!N ; t) < 0. It then follows that NS() < 0 and
W () < 0. On the other hand, if IS() > 0, then it is possible that 	(e!N ; t) > 0, and NS()
(as well as W ()) may be positive or negative.
Observe also that, under Condition 1, NS() is concave in t. Since IS() is also concave in t
(Proposition 2), W () is as well, except that the external tari¤ that maximizes it is lower than t^.
Finally, the external tari¤ that maximizes welfare for a large PTA partner is ine¢ ciently high
for a smaller PTA partner. Intuitively, the tari¤ preference has a better e¤ect when ! is lower.
Thus, to maximize the aggregate incumbent supplier e¤ect, it is optimal to have an external tari¤
that promotes a high enough relationship-strengthening e¤ect for the best suppliers even when
that comes at the cost of lowering the welfare created by the marginal incumbent supplier. Hence,
	(e!N ; t) = r(0; t) is decreasing in t at t = t^ and welfare from all reallocations falls with t. We
then have the following (see the Appendix for the proof).
Proposition 7 If  < 1, then W () is maximized for t < t^.
6 Alternative Specications for the Generic Industry
As indicated in section 2, the assumption that all generic inputs are produced in ROW is not
without loss of generality. Here we briey discuss how our results would be a¤ected under alternative
specications for the location of the generic industry.
The structure that would impinge the greatest changes on our results is when Foreign is an
exporter of g. In that case, the reduction of tari¤s with the PTA would a¤ect both types of inputs
in the same way, and therefore would have no impact on the sourcing of q from Foreign. However,
an analogous, but in some aspects inverse, analysis could be made in that case for the sourcing of
q from ROW, which would then be discriminated against g under the PTA. There would be, in
particular, a relationship-weakening e¤ect for vertical chains that are preserved in ROW after the
PTA. The more general point of our analysis would nevertheless remain valid: a PTA improves the
incentives to invest for the specialized suppliers whose inputs become relatively cheaper than the
generic alternative, but worsens the incentives to invest for the specialized suppliers whose inputs
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become relatively more expensive than the generic alternative because of the tari¤ preference.
For the reallocation of vertical chains, on the other hand, what matters is the relative tari¤
on specialized inputs from the two locations. Therefore, the essential insights from our previous
analysis would remain unchanged if Foreign exported g, as they do not hinge on the location of the
generic industry.
There are other possible specications for the location of the generic industry, but they would
have much less impact on our results. For example, if Home did not import but instead produced
domestically all generic inputs that its buyers purchase, all of our novel results would remain
unaltered. To see that, notice that all the action in the model hinges upon the di¤erence between
the tari¤s applied to g and q. For notational simplicity, we dened the initial tari¤ to be the same,
t, for both, but by now it should be clear that the whole analysis would carry through if the tari¤s
on g and q were, respectively, tg and tq, with tg 6= tq. Regarding the main insights of the analysis,
the situation where Home produces all g it uses corresponds to the special case where tg = 0.
Another possibility is when Foreign has an industry of generics but the industry is unable to
supply enough g to fulll Homes demand, so Home still imports g from ROW under the PTA.
Again, that would leave all of our novel results essentially unchanged, for the reasons discussed
above. The main di¤erence is that in this case the PTA would also generate trade diversion in the
sourcing of generic inputs, of the type analyzed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), which by now
is well-known.
7 Deep Integration
A dening characteristic of all preferential trade agreements is the reduction of bilateral tari¤s.
However, PTAs are increasingly encompassing several other policies. These include the harmo-
nization of product standards, bilateral recognition of intellectual property rights, rules providing
investment protection, a common competition policy, etc.26 Our framework can be readily ex-
tended to incorporate provisions like those. In fact, since such nontari¤ policies are likely to alter
the e¤ective level of investment protection for specialized suppliers, our framework is particularly
well suited for that purpose.
26See, for example, World Trade Organization (2011) for a detailed discussion of the growing prevalence of those
nontari¤ provisions in actual PTAs.
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To analyze the di¤erential impact of PTAs, let us then consider a simple extension of our
benchmark model that incorporates bilateral recognition of intellectual property rights, focusing
initially on a single partnership. Part of Bs bargaining power could be due to its ability to
sometimes costlessly copy Ss technology. To capture this idea, suppose that after the investment
is made but prior to bargaining over input production, nature determines whether Ss technology
is appropriable. With probability , the suppliers idea is not appropriable by the buyer, and they
bargain over 
j , j 2 fN;Pg, as in the benchmark model. With probability 1  , the buyer learns
how to imitate and use Ss technology to produce specialized inputs and the supplier earns zero
revenue. The probability  is a function of the stringency of bilateral recognition of IPRs.
The rst-best level of investment remains the same. But the suppliers expected prot, net of
the investment cost, is now 
j , and her problem under trade regime j is now
max
i

j   I(i).
E¤ectively, the suppliers bargaining power becomes 0  . We term 0 the level of supplier
investment protection. The entire previous analysis carries through with 0 replacing .
Of course, myriad factors inuence the determination of IPRs in an economy, but the modeling
of how  is determined is beyond the scope of this paper. We can, however, incorporate into
our framework the possibility that a PTA brings about not only lower preferential tari¤s but also
provisions related to recognition of bilateral IPRs. A natural way to do so is to assume that a deep
PTAboth removes the tari¤ between Home and Foreign and puts in place rules/institutions that
result in stricter recognition of bilateral intellectual property rights. Since such institutional changes
may be di¢ cult to alter, this is best modeled as a marginal increase in  (and hence in 0).27
Note, rst, that dq=d > 0, so deep integration is associated with a greater boost to bilateral
trade ows, relative to shallow integration that only lowers tari¤s. As indicated in the intro-
duction, this is consistent with recent empirical ndings. Furthermore, d2q=ddt > 0; thus, deep
integration is complementary to shallow integration (i.e., a PTA that simply reduces bilateral tar-
i¤s) with respect to trade ows. Hence, the greater the tari¤ preference, the more e¤ective deep
27Here we are following a modeling approach analogous to that of Osnago, Rocha and Ruta (2018), who model deep
integration as an increase in the parameter governing contractibility, although they do so in the context of Antràs
and Helpmans (2008) model.
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integration is in terms of boosting bilateral trade. Entirely analogous statements can be made
about the impact of a deep PTA on the investment e¤ect, i.
Now, the welfare implications of deep integration are much more subtle. As the analysis of the
previous section makes clear, the welfare impact of a shallow PTA already has several di¤erent
components. To keep the analysis simple and to shed light on the e¤ects of deep integration, we
focus on the case when Foreign is a large, natural trading partner of Home; that is, when  = 1.
To see how an increase in  a¤ects the welfare impact of a PTA, we need rst to understand how
supplier investment protection 0 changes W (1). Clearly, sourcing diversion e¤ects are una¤ected
by 0, but relationship-strengthening e¤ects are, since 0 determines the e¤ective intensity of the
hold-up problem. And recall that the agreement enhances overall welfare if it serves primarily to
substitute for complete contracts for su¢ ciently productive rms, but not otherwise.
When investment protection is very strong (0 is near 1), there is no meaningful contractual
ine¢ ciency to substitute for. In that case, a PTA distorts sourcing decisions and induces excessive
relationship-specic investment. In terms of equation (27), observe that when 0 ! 1, HUPN
vanishes but EXCP > 0, so RS < 0 for any tari¤. Thus, when 0 ! 1, the tari¤ discrimination
under the PTA is necessarily harmful for society, as it generates sourcing diversion and a negative
RS.
Conversely, when investment protection is seriously lacking (0 is near 0), the PTA is a poor
substitute for contracts because the investment response to the PTA is too weak. In that case, the
agreement merely distorts sourcing decisions. This is clear from (27), since lim0!0i = 0. Thus,
also when 0 ! 0, the tari¤ discrimination under the PTA only brings undesirable e¤ects.
In turn, when investment protection is neither too low nor too high, then PTAs can be e¤ective.
In that case, there is meaningful underinvestment but investment is su¢ ciently responsive to the
tari¤ discrimination engendered by a PTA.
The next proposition formalizes those statements and shows how 0 a¤ects W (1) more gen-
erally. See the Appendix for the proof.
Proposition 8 When  = 1, the welfare impact of the PTA is strictly negative when either 0 ! 0
or 0 ! 1, is increasing in 0 when 0 ! 0 and decreasing in 0 when 0 ! 1. Furthermore, it is
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maximized at an interior level O, dened as
O  2c [pw  E (!;!  e!N )]
(4c  b2) [pw  E (!;!  e!N )] + (2c  b2) t . (37)
Hence, tari¤ preferences under a PTA cannot help if IPRs are too weak or the fundamental
hold-up problem is too serious (as both lead to a very small 0), and cannot help either if IPRs
are too strong and the fundamental hold-up problem is mild (as this would imply a very high 0).
Instead, tari¤ preferences can help when both the original ine¢ ciency and the stringency of IPRs
are moderate.
A direct consequence of Proposition 8 is that, when 0 > O an increase in 0 through a higher
 lowers the welfare impact of the agreement, despite its positive e¤ect on trade ows. The reason
is that the benecial role of the PTA in our context of international sourcing is to boost investment
when investment is ine¢ ciently low. When 0 is already relatively high, further increasing it in
the context of a PTA would bring little benecial (and possibly excessive) investment coupled with
sourcing diversion, thus decreasing the benets of the agreement (and possibly turning them into
a net loss).
On the other hand, when 0 < O a deep PTA has a higher welfare impact than a shallow
agreement would. In that case hold-up problems are severe, and improving IPRs between the two
PTA partners would boost the benets brought about by the preferential tari¤ treatment, so there
is a positive complementarity, from a social standpoint, between the e¤ects of tari¤ discrimination
and stricter IPRs on the suppliers investment. Thus, we have the following.
Corollary 2 Let  = 1 and consider a deep PTAthat, in addition to eliminating bilateral tari¤s,
marginally increases bilateral recognition of IPRs, . Such deep provision enhances the welfare
impact of the PTA (i.e., is a social strategic complement to bilateral tari¤ liberalization) if the
existing level of bilateral IPRs is relatively low:  < O=. Conversely, the deep provision reduces
the welfare impact of the PTA (i.e., is a social strategic substitute to bilateral tari¤ liberalization)
if the existing level of bilateral IPRs is relatively high:  > O=.
Hence, our model implies that "deeper" PTA provisions improve the impact of preferential tari¤
liberalization when IPRs are weak, but may not otherwise.
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Another way of looking at the impact of deep provisions in PTAs is to consider how they a¤ect
the threshold !. It is not di¢ cult to see that ! is concave in  and reaches a maximum at an
intermediate value of , ^ =
2c 
p
2c(2c b2)
b2
. Thus, deep integration amplies the range of suppliers
for which tari¤ preferences bring welfare gains whenever initial levels of investment protection are
su¢ ciently low. Otherwise, deep integration shrinks the number of Y-chains for which the PTA
increases welfare.
Analogously, we can see how the strength of IPRs a¤ects the level of tari¤ preference consistent
with the PTA being welfare-improving. See the Appendix for the proof.
Proposition 9 When  = 1, the highest level of the external tari¤ consistent with the PTA being
welfare-improving, 2t^, reaches a maximum at an interior level of IPRs, ^ =
2c 
p
2c(2c b2)
b2
.
Thus, deep integration extends the level of the external tari¤ under which the PTA brings
welfare gains whenever initial levels of investment protection are su¢ ciently low. Put di¤erently,
when either the fundamental hold-up problem is severe or IPRs are weak, deep integration is a
social strategic complement to "shallow" integration, enhancing the e¢ cacy of the tari¤ preference
in promoting e¢ ciency-enhancing investment. On the other hand, when investment protection
is high, deep integration reduces the maximum level of the external tari¤ consistent with the
PTA increasing welfare. Deep integration becomes then a social strategic substitute to shallow
integration. In that case, there is a rationale for keeping the agreement restricted to its basic role
of eliminating bilateral tari¤s.
Observe that developing countries are typically associated with high tari¤s (and high external
tari¤s under a PTA) and weak recognition of international IPRs (and therefore a low  and a
resulting low 0). This tends to generate conditions unfavorable to shallow integration (in the sense
that t tends to be higher than 2t^, since a low  reduces t^). The introduction of deep provisions
could therefore help to make South-Southand North-SouthPTAs welfare-improving. Figure 8
illustrates that point.28 When t is high and 0 is low, W (1) < 0. If, however, the agreement also
promotes a su¢ ciently large increase in 0 (through an increase in ), then W (1) > 0 becomes
possible.
28The gure uses the same parametrization used in Figure 5, for k = 2. We note that it is well known that Pareto
provides a good t for the distribution of rm productivity in many contexts. This is the conclusion of, for example,
the cross-industry analysis of Corcos et al. (2012) for the European Union. In particular, in their study the average
parameter k across industries is estimated to very close to 2.
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Fig. 8: W ( = 1) for Pareto (k = 2)
In contrast, developed economies are typically associated with low tari¤s (and low external
tari¤s under a PTA) and strong IPRs regimes (and therefore a high  and a resulting high 0).
While this tends to provide generally favorable conditions for preferential liberalization (in the
sense that t tends to be lower than 2t^), our analysis suggests that North-NorthPTAs may be
more e¤ective if kept shallow. To see this in Figure 8, observe that, for combinations of very low t
and very high 0, W (1) > 0. However, if the agreement included deep provisions that induced a
higher 0, the welfare gain would not be as large.
At the cost of introducing some ambiguity in the results, one can readily extend the analysis
to the general case where  2 [0; 1]. An important issue when doing that is to dene whether the
change in IPRs is indeed bilateral, only with respect to Foreign, or multilateral. Indeed, many deep
provisions in recent PTAs do not have a preferential nature. Here we hint at what would be the
additional e¤ects of a deep PTA when the deep provision is not discriminatory.
Observe rst that, when IPRs are nondiscriminatory, none of the matching cuto¤s fe!N ; e!F ; e!ROW g
depend upon 0. Then the analysis of how 0 a¤ects new suppliers is entirely analogous to the analy-
sis of how it a¤ects incumbent suppliers. The only important di¤erence is that, because of the new
suppliers worse distribution of productivity, the level of supplier bargaining power that would
maximize welfare for this group would be strictly below O.
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On the other hand, the e¤ect of  on MD() is entirely di¤erent: it can be shown that the
welfare loss due to matching diversion is more severe, the higher is the supplier investment protec-
tion. This happens because the surplus generated by a Y-chain exhibits complementarity between
productivity and supplier investment protection. As a result, the loss due to the reallocation of
suppliers is especially large when suppliers have more bargaining power.
Hence, the e¤ect of supplier investment protection on NS() also has two components: one
has an inverse-U shape akin to the e¤ect on IS(), but shifted to the left; the other is negative
and strictly decreasing. The net result is generally undened because the density f(!) could yield
convex portions in MD(). Barring very particular distributions, however, the 0 that maximizes
NS() will tend to be lower than O, but a similar analysis would carry through.
8 Positive Implications of a PTA
The main goal of our analysis is to investigate the welfare implications of PTAs under global
sourcing. However, our model also has some clear positive, testable implications for the matching
structure of the economy, for the productivity of matched rms, and for the trade ows following
the formation of a PTA. The e¤ects depend on whether a buyer is matched with a supplier in
Foreign or in ROW prior to the PTA.
Specically, we have that buyers forming vertical chains in PTA member countries prior to the
agreement keep their original suppliers and source more from them. Thus, there is an intensive
margin positive e¤ect for incumbent suppliers in Foreign. Moreover, because of the higher invest-
ment levels, the productivity of those suppliers increases, so there is also a productivity e¤ect for
those matches.
Now, for rms forming vertical chains in non-PTA countries prior to the PTA, there will not be
any change for those buying from the highly productive suppliers there. In turn, those sourcing from
less productive rms switch to suppliers within the trading bloc, and their baseline productivity
is lower than the productivity of their previous suppliers outside the bloc. Hence, there is also an
across-country extensive margin e¤ect, from outside to inside the trading bloc, for buyers originally
matched with suppliers located outside the bloc that are not very productive.
Observe that the new suppliers inside the bloc did not invest and did not export before the
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PTA. Therefore, the increase in investment is especially large for them and takes place only because
they anticipate exporting. Interestingly, that testable prediction i.e., a particularly large increase
in investment for average-productivity producers that start to export because of preferential market
access is exactly what Lileeva and Treer (2010) nd in the context of preferential liberalization
between Canada and the United States.
Recently, datasets that include the identity and characteristics of matched rms across countries
are becoming increasingly available. If a PTA is implemented between two of the countries for
which such data are available, one could investigate the validity of those relatively straightforward
implications.
Sugita, Teshima and Seira (2018) provide an interesting analysis along those lines, but focusing
on the characteristics of the matching equilibria. They study the e¤ects of a trade policy shock
that is akin to a removal of import preferences: the end of very restrictive import quotas on (some)
clothing and textiles products on 1 January 2005 in the US. Those quotas applied to imports coming
from some countries (especially China) but not to others (like Mexico). The authors investigate
how the trade policy shock a¤ected the structure of buyer-seller matches between the US and
Mexico. They nd that the removal of the preferential treatment that Mexico enjoyed caused
signicant partner switching, and that those changes played the main role in the ensuing trade
ow adjustments. Interestingly, they also nd that the trade shock increased the e¢ ciency of the
matches. In the context of our paper, one could interpret their results as evidence that there
was matching diversion under the preferential quota system, which receded once the quotas were
eliminated.
9 Conclusion
Under global sourcing with incomplete contracts and endogenous buyer-supplier matching, a PTA
a¤ects the e¢ ciency of the production process both through cost-reducing investment and through
changes in the set of vertical chains. For that reason, a PTA can be welfare-enhancing even when
there is no standard trade creation, as long as specialized suppliers are su¢ ciently productive and
the tari¤ preference is not too high. The primary channel for positive welfare e¤ects is through
improved investments by suppliers originally located in PTA member countries. New vertical chains
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could enhance welfare in circumstances where PTA countries have a large number of relatively
productive suppliers that are idle without the PTA. However, rematching always lowers the average
baseline productivity of suppliers and some new vertical chains always lower welfare under the PTA.
Deep provisions in PTAs enhance trade ows between members, but their welfare implications
are subtle. For example, improved IPRs enhance investment protection, boosting incentives for
relationship-specic investments. But that can improve or worsen the welfare impact of a PTA,
depending upon whether changes in investment are already too strong under shallow integration.
For that reason, shallow integration may be best for "North-North" agreements, whereas deep
integration tends to be helpful for PTAs that involve developing economies where IPRs are lacking.
Our work is a small but we believe an important step toward understanding the implications
of preferential liberalization in the context of global sourcing. In particular, our model o¤ers a
promising framework for future work. For example, one could extend the model to capture the
e¤ects of other deep provisions like improved product-quality standards. This could be modeled as
an improved ability of a supplier to have the outside option to sell its output to rms other than
her matched buyer. One could also adjust the model to capture the possibility that deep PTA
provisions may select on productivity. If rms were required to pay xed costs to take advantage
of improved IPRs, say, then only higher-productivity rms would choose to do so. Hence, deep
provisions could e¤ectively achieve exclusion through facilitating choices that rms make. This has
potential for framing empirical analyses of whether and how deep provisions select on productivity.
Our analysis also has implications for the design of PTAs. Studying further the optimality of
preferential margins and of deep provisions is one natural way to proceed. Another is to consider
criteria for selecting industries for exclusion from PTAs. Industry exclusion is a staple of PTAs.
Although Article XXIV of the GATT requires that "substantially all trade" must be included in
every preferential agreement, the vagueness of the requirement allows for very exible interpreta-
tions. Furthermore, PTAs that do not include developed economies can be notied to the World
Trade Organization under the "Enabling Clause," which imposes even weaker constraints, as Or-
nelas (2016) points out. As a result, in reality PTA exclusions vary from a few products to several
entire sectors.29 Surprisingly, there are very few theoretical analyses of sector exclusions in PTAs,
29For example, Deardor¤ and Sharma (2018) study 240 importer-exporter pairs within PTAs initiated prior to
2005, and nd that the fraction of excluded products during 2009-11 is ten percent for the US and ranges between
3% and 44% for all countries in the sample.
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the most notable exception being the political-economy analysis of Grossman and Helpman (1995).
Here, we nd that the high-productivity industries are the most valuable in an agreement if we
considered only incumbent suppliers. However, once we take into account the inux of new suppli-
ers, that conclusion is no longer warranted. Indeed, if it were feasible, a social planner would like
to prevent, in every PTA and in every industry, the full market-driven reallocation of buyers across
vertical chains.
Our framework could potentially be employed to shed light on current policy debates as well.
For example, in the recent renegotiation of NAFTA, its members agreed to tighten the rules of
origin requirements for the automotive sector to qualify for zero tari¤s within the bloc. As Conconi
et al. (2018) show, NAFTAs existing ROOs already reduce imports of intermediate products from
outside the bloc. Here, one way to incorporate the new tightening would be to explicitly model
the sourcing of additional inputs by specialized suppliers. Alternatively, since the ROOs tend
to increase the cost of production of North American rms by endogenously raising the cost of
foreign inputs, one could model their tightening as a downward shift (possibly nonuniform) of the
underlying distribution of productivity of suppliers within NAFTA. According to our analysis, that
would lower the welfare impact due to all incumbent specialized suppliers. On the other hand, by
worsening the distribution of productivity inside the bloc relative to the distribution of productivity
outside the bloc, the tari¤preferences cum tight ROOs may not yield any new suppliers, and instead
generate negative matching diversion with possible positive welfare e¤ects.
At a more general level, an increasingly important theme for policymakers and academics alike
is the expansion of global value chains. Our results help to justify the view that PTAs promote the
intensication of GVCs. First, they generate "more depth" in existing relationships, fueled by more
investment. Second, PTAs also generate "more width," in the sense of fueling the formation of new
relationships. Now, our setting is very simple, with a supply chain containing just two specialized
rms plus a competitive fringe. In contrast, a typical GVC includes several producers and parts
cross several national borders. But as Yi (2003) points out, tari¤s are typically applied on gross
exports. This suggests that the mechanisms we develop are likely to be even more important for
genuineGVCs, like the ones studied by Antràs and de Gortari (2017).
Baldwin (2011), the World Trade Organization (2011) and several others have argued that
regionalism nowadays is about the rules that underpin fragmentation of production, not about
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preferential market access. As such, Baldwin (2011) claims that the traditional Vinerian approach
is outdated and that we need a new framework that is as simple and compelling as the old one, but
relevant to 21st century regionalism(p. 23). Here we introduce several features that are deemed
central for the international fragmentation of production, and yet show that preferential market
access remains key for understanding the welfare impact of PTAs probably more than it has ever
been for the trade of nal goods. Critically, deep provisions in PTAs interact with preferential
market access in a way that reinforces the latters positive e¤ect on trade ows but whose welfare
implications are much more intricate than a simple look at trade ows would suggest. Thus, one
could view our model as a step towards a framework that extends the Vinerian view to the new
regionalismworld.
Appendix
E¢ cient investment levels Without an agreement, the e¢ cient investment level solves
max
i
pwqN   C(qN ; i; !)  I(i). (38)
The rst-order necessary condition is
pw
dqN
di
  Cq(qN ; i; !)dqN
di
  Ci(qN ; i; !) = I 0(i).
Using (3), this expression simplies to  Ci(qN ; i; !) = I 0(ie), as indicated in (8).
With a PTA, the e¢ cient investment level also solves (38), after replacing qN with qP . The
rst-order necessary condition is analogous to the one above, but using (15) it simplies to
 tdqP
di
  Ci(qP ; i; !) = I 0(i).
This expression may appear to yield a level of investment di¤erent from ie. However, developing it
further we obtain
 tb
c
+ b

pw + t  ! + bi
c

= 2i,
which is satised exactly when i = ie.
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Explicit expressions for welfare Inserting equilibrium investments and levels of inputs, we
have the following expressions for welfare:
	N (!) = [V (Q
)  pwQ] +
(pw   !)2
 
2c  2b2
(2c  b2)2 ,
	P (!; t) = [V (Q
)  pwQ] +
(pw + t  !)2
 
2c  2b2
(2c  b2)2  
2t (pw + t  !)
(2c  b2) .
Observe that the term in brackets in constant across trade regimes.
Matching Equilibrium We describe the full details of a Walrasian equilibrium in the market for
matches. Equilibrium requires an assignment of buyers to suppliers and a fee schedule describing
the net transfer from each supplier to the buyer that she is matched to, such that buyers and
suppliers choose matches to maximize prots (taking the schedule as given) and the market for
matches clears. For both the no-PTA and PTA cases, we rst introduce a more general notation
and state equilibrium conditions using this notation, then convert back to the notation in the main
text.
No PTA Consider rst the no PTA case. Let the suppliers pay the buyers a matching fee
M : 
fF;ROWg [0; b]! R. Let the assignment of matches follow N : [0; ]! 
fF;ROWg.
Dene the gross utility for a buyer of type b matched with a supplier of type ! in country y as
UB(b; !; y). Dene the gross utility for a supplier of type ! in country y matched with a buyer of
type b as US(!; y; b). Three sets of conditions must hold:
1. For each buyer b 2 [0; ]; the assignment N (b) solves
max
f!;yg
UB(b; !; y) +M(!; y; b).
Given the fee, buyers maximize prots over a choice of supplier (productivity ! and location y).
2. For each supplier (!; y) 2 
 fF;ROWg, each buyer match b 2  1N (
; fF;ROWg) solves
i) max
fbg
US(!; y; b) M(!; y; b).
Given the fee, suppliers maximize prots over a choice of buyer. Because there is an excess of
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suppliers ( < ), there is an additional requirement:
ii) max
fbg
US(!; y; b) M(!; y; b)  0 if  1N (
; fF;ROWg) is empty.
If a supplier is unassigned, then her payo¤ from matching with a buyer would be non-positive.
3. The assignments must also match all available buyers to all suppliers with types more
productive than marginal types:
Z
N ([0;]fF;ROWg)
dF (!) = ,Z
N ([0;]F )
dF (!)  ,Z
N ([0;]ROW )
dF (!)  1  .
Statement 1 implies that dM(!;y;b)d! =  dUB(b;!;y)d! , and because UB is a constant function of y,
M(!; y; b) is also a constant function of y. Because US is a constant function of b, statement 2(i)
implies that M(!; y; b) is a constant function of b. Statement 2(ii) implies the marginal supplier
earns exactly zero prot, and that this suppliers ! is the same in both countries. Hence, we drop
the b and y arguments from all functions and dene UNS (!)  US(!; y; b), UNB (!)  US(b; !; y)
and MN (!)  M(!; y; b). This redened notation is consistent with the notation in the main
text. Denoting e!N as a marginal supplier, statement 2(ii) implies UNS (e!N ) = MN (e!N ): Prot
maximization then guarantees that e!F = e!ROW = e!N for the no PTA case. Statement 3 and the
monotonicity of UNS (!) then imply that F (e!N ) = .
Given that dMN (!)d! =  dUB(!)d! , it follows thatMN (!) is the sum of UNB (!) and a constant term.
We construct the fee by specifying MN (!) =  UNB (!) +kN . Returning to a marginal supplier, we
can then write UNS (e!) =  UNB (e!) + kN . Hence, we can solve for kN and substitute into MN (!) to
nd
MN (!) = U
N
S (e!N )  UNB (!)  UNB (e!N ) :
PTA Now consider the PTA case, in which the level of discriminatory protection  2 f0; tg for
a B-S pair maps one-to-one with the suppliers location y: for y = F , we have  = t; for y = ROW ,
we have  = 0. Let the suppliers pay the buyers a matching fee M : 
  [0; b]  f0; tg ! R. Let
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the assignment of matches follow P : [0; ]! 
 fF;ROWg. Dene the gross utility for a buyer
of type b matched with a supplier of type !, where the match enjoys discriminatory protection via
tari¤  2 f0; tg, as UB(b; !; ). Dene the gross utility for a supplier of type ! matched with a
buyer of type b, where the match enjoys discriminatory protection via tari¤  2 f0; tg, as US(!;  ; b).
Three sets of conditions must hold:
1. For each buyer b 2 [0; ], the assignment P (b) solves
max
f!;g
UB(b; !; ) +M(!; b; )
Given the fee, buyers maximize prots over a choice of supplier (productivity ! and discriminatory
protection ).
2. For each supplier (!; ) 2 
 f0; tg, each buyer match b 2  1P (
; fF;ROWg) solves
i) max
fbg
US(!;  ; b) M(!; b; ).
Given the fee, suppliers maximize prots over a choice of buyer. Because there is an excess of
suppliers ( < ), there is an additional requirement:
ii) max
fbg
US(!;  ; b) M(!; b; )  0 if  1P (
; fF;ROWg) is empty.
If a supplier is unassigned, then her payo¤ from matching with a buyer would be non-positive.
3. The assignments must also match all available buyers to all suppliers with types more
productive than marginal types:
Z
P ([0;]fF;ROWg)
dF (!) = ,Z
P ([0;]F )
dF (!)  ,Z
P ([0;]ROW )
dF (!)  1  .
Statement 1 implies that dM(!;b;)d! =
 dUB(b;!;)
d! . Hence,
dM(!;b;0)
d! =
 dUB(b;!;0)
d! and
dM(!;b;t)
d! =
 dUB(b;!;t)
d! . Because US is a constant function of b; statement 2(i) implies that M(!; b; ) is a
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constant function of b. Statement 2(ii) implies the marginal supplier earns exactly zero prot.
Hence, we drop the b arguments from all functions and drop the tari¤ argument from functions
when  = 0. Note that the gross payo¤s for the buyer and supplier are, for the  = 0 case, the
same as in the no-PTA case. In converting notation, we therefore write gross utilities under  = 0
as UNS (!)  US(!; 0; b) and UNB (!)  US(b; !; 0). For the  = t case, we write gross utilities as
functions of the tari¤ size, UPS (!; t)  US(!; t; b) and UPB (!; t)  US(b; !; t). For the fees, we write
MP;ROW (!)  M(!; b; 0) and MP;F (!; t)  M(!; b; t).
Denoting e!ROW and e!F as marginal suppliers inROW and F , respectively, we have UNS (e!ROW ) =
MP;ROW (e!ROW ) and UPS (e!F ; t) =MP;F (e!F ; t). We also know from statement 1 that UNB (e!ROW )+
MP;ROW (e!ROW ) = UPB (e!F ; t)+MP;F (e!F ; t), because otherwise some buyers would not be maximiz-
ing prots. Hence, substituting, we can write UNB (e!ROW ) + UNS (e!ROW ) = UPB (e!F ; t) + UPS (e!F ; t).
It then follows immediately from the multiplicative separability of the total prot from a B   S
pair that b!F = b!ROW + t.30 Statement 3 implies that F (e!ROW + t) + (1  )F (e!ROW ) = .
We also have, because dMP;ROW (!)d! =
 dUNB (!)
d! , that MP;ROW (!) may be written as the sum
of  UPB (!) and a term that does not vary with !. Similarly, MP;F (!; t) may be written as the
sum of UPB (!; t) and a term that does not vary with !. We construct the fees by specifying
MP (!) =  UPB (!)+kP;ROW andMP (!; t) =  UPB (!; t)+kP;F . Returning to the marginal suppliers,
we can then write UNS (e!ROW ) =  UNB (e!ROW ) + kP;ROW and UPS (e!F ; t) =  UPB (e!F ; t) + kP;F .
Hence, we can solve for kP;ROW and kP;F , then substitute to nd
MP;ROW (!) = U
N
S (e!ROW )  UNB (!)  UNB (e!ROW ) ;
MP;F (!; t) = U
P
S (e!F ; t)  UPB (!; t)  UPB (e!F ; t) .
Stability Our setting is a continuous assignment model. Hence, equilibrium yields a stable
matching (Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame, 1992).
Rewriting NS() using a change of variables Start with the expression for the new supplier
e¤ect:
NS()  
Z e!F (t)
e!N 	P (!; t)f(!)d!   (1  )
Z e!N
e!ROW (t)	N (!)f(!)d!.
30This is easily seen by plugging into (20) and (19) for both  = 0 and  = t; and adding the expressions together.
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Changing the variable from ! to x; we note that d! = de!F (x)dx; so that
dx =
d!
d!F (x)
:
Then we note that
f(e!F (x))d! = (x; ; F )d!
de!F (x) = (x; ; F )dx;
where the rst equality follows from
de!F (x) = (1  )g(e!ROW )
g(e!F ) + (1  )g(e!ROW ) :
Substituting back in and adjusting the bounds of integration (e!N to x = 0 to at the lower end ande!F to x = t to at the upper end), we then have that

Z e!F
e!N 	P (!; t)f(!)d! =
Z t
0
	P (e!F (x); t)(x; ; F )dx:
A similar manipulation of the second term in NS() yields
(1  )
Z e!N
e!ROW (t)	N (!)f(!)d! =
Z t
0
	N (e!ROW (x))(x; ; F )dx:
Hence,
NS() =
Z t
0
[	P (e!F (x); t) 	N (e!ROW (x))](x; ; F )dx:
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. At t = 0, 	(!; t) = 0 by construction. We need to show, then,
that a small increase in t, starting at t = 0, raises 	(!; t). It is straightforward to see from (28)
that d	S(t=0)dt = 0. Now, we have that
d	R
dt
=
2c  b2
2c

(HUPN   EXCP ) di
dt
 idEXCP
dt

=
b
 
2c  b2
2c (2c  b2) [HUPN   EXCP  i] .
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Evaluated at t = 0, i(t = 0) = 0 and EXCP (t = 0) = iN   ie =  HUPN . Hence,
d	R
dt
(t = 0) =
b
 
2c  b2
c (2c  b2)HUPN > 0.
It follows that d	(!;t)dt (t = 0) =
d	R
dt (t = 0) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Equilibrium matching when  = 1 requires
F1(e!N1) = ,
F2(e!N2) = .
If F2(!) FOSD F1(!), the two distributions satisfy F1(!)  F2(!). It follows that
e!N1  e!N2.
The changes in welfare from the PTA for the two distributions are
W1( = 1;F1) =
Z e!N1
0
	(!; t)dF1(!) and
W2( = 1;F2) =
Z e!N2
0
	(!; t)dF2(!).
Hence,
W  W1( = 1;F1) W2( = 1;F2) =
Z e!N1
0
	(!; t)dF1(!) 
Z e!N2
0
	(!; t)dF2(!).
Integrating both terms by parts, we can write
W = 	(!; t)F1(!)je!N10  
Z e!N1
0
d	(!; t)
d!
F1(!)d!  
"
	(!; t)F2(!)je!N20  
Z e!N2
0
d	(!; t)
d!
F2(!)d!
#
= 	(e!N1; t)F1(e!N1)  Z e!N1
0
d	(!; t)
d!
F1(!)d!  
"
	(e!N2; t)F2(e!N2)  Z e!N2
0
d	(!; t)
d!
F2(!)d!
#
=  [	(e!N1; t) 	(e!N2; t)]  Z e!N1
0
d	(!; t)
d!
[F1(!)  F2(!)]d! +
Z e!N2
e!N1
d	(!; t)
d!
F2(!)d!
=
(
 [	(e!N1; t) 	(e!N2; t)] + Z e!N2e!N1 d	(!; t)d! F2(!)d!
)
 
Z e!N1
0
d	(!; t)
d!
[F1(!)  F2(!)]d!.
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Because d	(!;t)d! < 0, it follows that
 
Z e!N1
0
d	(!; t)
d!
[F1(!)  F2(!)]d! > 0.
Hence, it remains to show that the term in curly brackets is positive. Integrating its second term
by parts, we can write
fg =  [	(e!N1; t) 	(e!N2; t)] + 	(!; t)F2(!)je!N2e!N1   Z e!N2e!N1 	(!; t)dF2(!)
=  [	(e!N1; t) 	(e!N2; t)] + 	(e!N2; t)F2(e!N2) 	(e!N1; t)F2(e!N1)  Z e!N2e!N1 	(!; t)dF2(!)
= 	(e!N1; t) 	(e!N1; t)F2(e!N1)  Z e!N2e!N1 	(!; t)dF2(!),
where the nal line comes from setting F2(e!N2) =  and simplifying. We then have
fg = 	(e!N1; t) [F2(e!N2)  F2(e!N1)]  Z e!N2e!N1 	(!; t)dF2(!)
=
Z e!N2
e!N1 [	(e!N1; t) 	(!; t)] dF2(!) > 0:
Hence,
W =
Z e!N2
e!N1 [	(e!N1; t) 	(!; t)] dF2(!) 
Z e!N1
0
d	(!; t)
d!
[F1(!)  F2(!)]d! > 0,
concluding the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. By denition, the welfare impact of the PTA is zero when t = 0.
When there is a small increase in t, W (1) changes according to @W (1)@t =
Z e!N
0
@	(!;t)
@t dF (!).
We have that @	(!;t)@t =
2
(2c b2)2
 t 2c  2b2 + 2b2+ (pw   !)(1  )b2	. This expression
is strictly positive when evaluated at t = 0. Therefore, for su¢ ciently small preference margins,
W (1) > 0. Now notice that @
2W (1)
@t2
=
Z e!N
0
@2	(!;t)
@t2
dF (!) =  
Z e!N
0
2[2c 2b2+2b2]
(2c b2)2 dF (!) < 0.
Therefore, W (1) is maximized when @W (1)@t = 0. Simple algebra shows that this happens when
t = t^, as dened in (33). Finally, after some manipulation it follows that, when t = 2t^, W (1) = 0.
Since @
2W (t;1)
@t2
< 0, W (1) < 0 when t > 2t^.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Since d	N (!)d! < 0, we have that
Z e!ROW+t
e!N 	N (!)dF (!) <
Z e!ROW+t
e!N 	N (e!N )dF (!)
and Z e!N
e!ROW 	N (!)dF (!) >
Z e!N
e!ROW 	N (e!N )dF (!).
Now notice that

Z e!ROW+t
e!N 	N (e!N )dF (!)  (1  )
Z e!N
e!ROW 	N (e!N )dF (!)
= 	N (e!N ) [F (e!ROW + t) + (1  )F (e!ROW )  F (e!N )]
= 	N (e!N ) [   ] = 0,
where in the last line we use the equilibrium conditions (14) and (22). Hence,

Z e!ROW+t
e!N 	N (!)dF (!) < 
Z e!ROW+t
e!N 	N (e!N )dF (!)
= (1  )
Z e!N
e!ROW 	N (e!N )dF (!) < (1  )
Z e!N
e!ROW 	N (!)dF (!),
conrming that MD < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose t >
2(1 )b2[pw F 1()]
2c 2b2+2b2 . Then
r(0; t) =
t
(2c  b2)2

2b2(1  )(pw(1  ))  t(2c+ 2b2   2b2)

< 0.
By Lemma 5, it follows that NS() =
R t
0 r(x; t)(x; ; F )dx < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. We use NS() =
R t
0 r(x; t)(x; ; F )dx. It is obvious that if t = 0, then
NS() = 0. Di¤erentiating, we have
dNS()
dt
= r(t; t)(t; ; F ) +
Z t
0
dr(x; t)
dt
(x; ; F )dx.
Because r(0; 0) = 0, it is also obvious that dNS(;t=0)dt = 0. Then, if
d2NS()
dt2
< 0 for all t, then
NS() < 0 for all t as well. We now show that, under Condition 1, d
2NS()
dt2
< 0 for all t. After
59
using the functional form for the r function to substitute, we have:
d2NS()
dt2
=
(
(t; ; F )
"
d
dt
 2t (pw   e!ROW (t))
(2c  b2)

+
d	
0
P (t; !)
dt
#)
+
Z t
0
d2r(x; t)
dt2
(; x;F )dx 

2t (pw   e!ROW (t))
(2c  b2)

d(t; ; F )
dt

. (39)
Start with the term in braces, expand the expression and substitute according to the functional
form for d	
0
P (t;!)
dt :
fg =
 2(t; ; F )
(2c  b2)

("
t
 
 
fd!ROW (t)
dt
!
+ (pw   e!ROW (t))#  "(1  )b2 (pw   e!F (t))  t  2c  2b2 + 2b2
2c  b2
#)
.
Rearranging, we can write
fg =
 2(t; ; F )
(2c  b2)

(
(pw   e!ROW (t))  (1  )b2 (pw   e!F (t))
2c  b2

+ t
"
 de!ROW (t)
dt

+
 
2c  2b2 + 2b2
2c  b2
#)
.
The term in the second bracket [] is clearly positive, and a few lines of algebra show that the term
in the rst bracket is also positive. Hence the entire expression is negative. Next, consider the rst
term on the second line of (39). This is the aggregate of the second-order e¤ects of the tari¤ for
reallocations, each of which is negative. Hence,
R t
0
d2r(x;t)
dt2
(; x;F )dx < 0. Finally, consider the
second term on the second line of (39). Because d(t;;F )dt  0 under Condition 1, the entire term is
non-positive. This shows that d
2NS()
dt2
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Dene t to be the lowest value of t such that W () = 0. Di¤eren-
tiating, we have that dW ()dt =
dIS()
dt +
dNS()
dt . In the limit, limt!0
dIS()
dt > limt!0
dNS()
dt = 0.
Hence, limt!0
dW ()
dt > 0 and t > 0.
From Proposition 2, IS() < 0 for any t > 2t^ and IS() is decreasing in t for any t > t^. From
Proposition 4, NS() < 0 for any t > tNS . It is straightforward to show that t^ < tNS < 2t^. Hence,
if t  2t^, then W () = IS() +NS() < 0. By continuity of W (), it follows that W () < 0
for some t < 2t^ as well. Dene t to be the highest t such that W () = 0. Thus, we have shown
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that t 2 [t; 2t^).
Finally, Condition 1 implies that W () is strictly concave in t. Hence, W () = 0 for just
one value of t = t = t.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let  < 1. We will show that W is strictly decreasing in t for any
t  t^. We can write W =  R e!N0 	(!; t)dF (!) + NS(). From Proposition 2 we know thatR e!N
0 	(!; t)dF (!) is maximized at t = t^ and has an inverted-U shape with respect to t. Hence,
the derivative of  times this term with respect to t is zero at t = t^ and is negative for t > t^
Let t  t^. Recall that
rw(0; t) =
t
(2c  b2)2

2b2(1  )(pw   e!N )  t(2c+ 2b2   2b2) :
Di¤erentiating, we have
rw(0; t)
dt
=
1
(2c  b2)2

2b2(1  )(pw   e!N )  t(2c+ 2b2   2b2)  t(2c+ 2b2   2b2)	
=
1
(2c  b2)2

2b2(1  )(pw   e!N )  2t(2c+ 2b2   2b2) ,
which is negative if
t >
b2(1  )(pw   e!N )
(2c+ 2b2   2b2) .
Note that
t^ =
(1  )b2 [pw  E (!;!  e!N )]
2c  2b2 + 2b2 
b2(1  )(pw   e!N )
(2c+ 2b2   2b2) .
Hence, if t  t^, then drw(0;t)dt < 0. Now, we can also show that drw(x;t)dt is decreasing in x:
d2rw(x; t)
dxdt
=
 4(1  )(1  )b2
(2c  b2)2 < 0.
This implies that Z t
0
drw(x; t)
dt
(x; ; F )dx < 0.
Because (t; ; F )rw(t; t) < 0 for any t, we have
NS0(t) = (t; ; F )rw(t; t) +
Z t
0
drw(x; t)
dt
(x; ; F )dx < 0.
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This show that NS(t) is decreasing in t for any t  t^. Hence, t^ does not maximize W .
Proof of Proposition 8. It follows immediately from (33), after replacing  by 0, that
lim0!0 t^ = lim0!1 t^ = 0. Therefore, since a PTA is dened by t > 0, lim0!0W (1) < 0 and
lim0!1W (1) < 0. Simple algebra shows that lim0!0
@	(!;t)
@0 > 0 and lim0!1
@	(!;t)
@0 < 0;
hence, lim0!0
@W (1)
@0 > 0 and lim0!1
@W (1)
@0 < 0. Now, setting
@W (1)
@0 = 0 and manipulating,
we obtain a single solution for 0, given by expression (37). Since W (1) is increasing in 0 when
0 is close to one but decreasing in 0 when 0 is close to zero, O must dene a maximum.
Proof of Proposition 9. After replacing  by 0 = , di¤erentiate (33) with respect to 0 and
reorganize to obtain
@t^
@0
=  
2b2

2c  40c+ (0)2 b2

[pw  E (!;!  e!N )]h
2c  20b2 + (0)2 b2
i2 .
Solving this expression for  yields ^ =
2c 
p
2c(2c b2)
b2
as the unique stationary point of the function
t^(). Since we know that t^ > 0 except at the extreme values of 0, when it is zero, ^ must constitute
a maximum of t^().
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